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for the World Trade Organization  .(WTO)  and its  that affect manufactures are concentrated in textiles and
predecessor, GATT  - reviews that document the  clothing. Developing  countries should ensure that
progress developing countrirs have made in integration  industrial countries implement their commitments to
with the world trading system  over the past decade.  liberalize  this sector and impose no new nontariff
Based  on an analysis  of post-Uruguay Round,twriff  and  barriers in this or other sectors under the guise of other
nontariff barriers worldwide, he then recommends  rules or arrangements.
developing country positions  on major issues in the new  The remaining nontariff barriers in developing
round of WTO trade negotiations.  countries should be converted into tariffs and reduced
His key conclusions  and recommendations:  over time as part of the negotiations.
* Agriculture.  Developing countries should support the  * Antidunpmg.  The increased use of antidumping
Cairns Group in its push for greater liberalization of  measures  by high- and middle-income  developing
industrial countries' agricultural  trade policies; the  countries in recent periods offers an opportunity for
revised Food Aid Convention is not a substitute for but a  balanced negotiations to restrict their use. Reduced use
complement to worldwide liberalization  of agriculture.  of antidumping measures  would increase efficiency  and
* Manufactures.  The existence of tariff peaks and  benefit consumers in all countries. But it is unclear
escalation  in industrial country markets and the limited  whether a supportive climate for such negotiations exists
bindings  at relatively  high levels of developing country  in either industrial or developing countries.
tariffs on manufactures present opportunities for
negotiations with good prospects for shared and
balanced benefits.
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iiiTRADE POLICY AND MARKET ACCESS ISSUES FOR DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES:
Implications  for the Millenium  Round
SUMMARY
Following the Uruguay Round Agreements  (URA) developing countries increased their integration
into the world economy. As the World Trade Organization  (WTO) is about to embark on a new Round of
multilateral trade negotiations, this  study analyses two important dimensions of  developing countries'
integration  in the international  trading system:  their own trade policies and  problems of market access for
their merchandise  exports. The results of the analysis are then used to recommend an agenda of topics and
developing  country  positions for the upcoming WTO negotiations.
The major innovation of this  study is that it is based on a  systematic review of the detailed
information contained in  61 Trade Policy Reviews (CPRs) of 42  developing countries prepared for
GA'fT/WTO over the period 1989-1998. The TPRs contain a great deal of detailed and authoritative
information  on countries' trade policies and institutions  on a consistent basis and over time which has not
been hitherto systematically  analysed. The group of developing countries on which the study is based
includes thirteen developing economies from Latin America and the Caribbean, thirteen from Asia and the
Pacific, eleven from Sub-Sahara Africa  and five from Europe, Middle-East  and North Africa which together
account for the bulk of the trade of developing  members  of the WTO
The main findings  and recommendations  are as follows:
1.  The integration of the developing countries into the multilateral trading system has been
especially impressive for a group of perhaps 15-20 middle and higher income developing countries in
Latin  America and  Asia.  For many others, progress has been much slower. Following the URA,
protection both through tariff and non-tariff measures appears to  be greater in  low- income than in
middle- and higher- income developing countries. While this  conclusion is  subject to  a  number of
methodological caveats,  it suggests the  variety of challenges and opportunities different developing
countries will face in the context of future WTO negotiations.
2. The URA resulted in  a  major step forward by  bringing the  agriculture sector under the
disciplines of the GATT. Nonetheless,  very substantial protection continues to be present through a
variety of controls and interventions that encumber intemational trade in agriculture. Various developing
countries face different situations and challenges in their agricultural sector, which are likely to result in
different groups of developing countries emphasizing different issues in  the up-coming negotiations.
There are two main groups: (a) major exporters  of agricultural commodities, members of the Cairns group
who would be seeking to  reduce the  Aggregate Measures of  Support (AMS) and export subsidies
provided to agriculture by developed countries; (b) traditional net food importing developing countries
and others with substantial protection of agriculture which are concerned that export subsidy reduction by
the developed countries will increase their import bills. These countries have been seeking to obtain an
increased amount of food aid through the recently renegotiated Food Aid Convention to compensate for
whatever increased costs export subsidy reduction may entail. While the revised Convention should prove
of greater assistance to developing countries as a whole, and could help in a small way in dealing with
some  of  the food  security problems many face, it  is  not  a  substitute for  further liberalization of
agricultural trade - indeed it should be viewed as a supporting element for such liberalization.  Reduced
protection in  developed country markets will improve market access prospects both for existing and
potential exporters; while reduced export subsidies by developed countries will reduce international
market distortions that impede the expansion of developing country agricultural production.
iv3. There is  mounting support  by both developed and developing countries that negotiations for
the  mutual reduction of tariffs on manufactures  be included in the future Round. The analysis shows that
developing countries continue to face tariff peaks and escalation in developed country markets for some
categories of manufacturing products-albeit  to a smaller degree than before the URA. But the analysis
also shows that applied tariffs for manufactures are on average higher in developing countries tian  in
developed countries; that this even more the case, when bound rates are compared; and  that  many
developing countries have not  bound a  significant proportion of their  tariffs on manufactures. The
conclusion is that there is a good opportunity for a negotiation with prospects for shared and balanced
benefits, for developed and developing countries alike, emanating both from the liberalization unde taken
by countries themselves and improvements  in foreign market access; and that a formula approach is likely
to be helpful in securing reductions in developed country tariff peaks.
4. As there are few non-tariff barriers (NTBs) still in place in the developed countries outslde the
tex^;'e  and  clothing  sector, the  key  issues developing countries  face  are  how to  ensure  that:  (a)
cc  itmnents  under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) are implemented; and (b)NTI3s are
nc.  iposed under the guise of other rules or arrangements. Also, some developing countries continue to
impose NTBs on manufacturing imports. These have been shown to be very damaging to their economies
for a variety of reasons including through the lack of transparency and the stimulation of wasteful rent
seeking. These measures should be eliminated at the earliest possible opportunity, or, where appropriate,
converted  into tariffs  that  wilF be  subject  to  reductions over time,  possibly  as  part of  the  WTO
negotiations.
5. In the last few years anti-dumping action has become the instrument of choice for providing
trade remedies by both developed and higher and middle income developing countries. Their example is
likely to  be followed by other developing countries in the future. Anti-dumping actions  have been
especially frequent against imports from non-WTO members and, in particular, so called "non-rnarket"
economies  in the former Soviet Union and China. Although anti-dumping actions carry the potential of
shielding  inefficient domestic  producers, their  proliferation in  developing  countries and  especially
against  developed  country  exporters,  could  well  provide the  balance  needed  for  a  longer  term
reconsideration and tightening of the WTO anti-dumping agreement provisions.  Such a reconsideration
should aim at reducing the flexibility all countries have in granting relief through this instrument.and
induce governments to rely more on safeguard actions, which tend to be more transparent ane time-
limitec
6. Developing countries have reduced  interventions aimed at controlling or taxing  primary
exports, while bringing their practices in promoting manufacturing exports more in line with the overall
disciplines of the WTO, e.g. with regard to the use of export subsidies. Nonetheless, export controls on
primary products continue to  be  present and  pose dangers  in  a number of countries:  they  create
disincentives to  production  for  export  which  may  reduce export  earnings; and  could  lead  to  the
establishment of inefficient domestic processing industries, which can only survive through the implicit
protection afforded by the artificially lower domestic input prices. Alternative instruments for support of
domestic processing activities are available and should be used instead.
7. Many  developing  countries, especially lower income and  Least Developed Countries face
significant constraints in their capacity to implement effectively their WTO obligations in a number of
areas, including customs administration, Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary measures, and technical barriers to
trade.  These  constraints have  been recognized in  the WT0  agreements, which  permit  developing
countries longer time frames to bring their policies and institutions into line with their WITO  obligations
in some of these areas, as well as encourage developed country members to provide technical assistance
in  support  of  developing  country  efforts  to  strengthen their  institutions.  Considerable  amounts  of
vtechnical assistance are available from a variety of bilateral donors and internationalorganizations. There
are problems, however, regarding the effective co-ordination of such assistance, ensuring that it is not
supply- driven and reflects accurately the priorities and needs of the developing countries concerned.
While the WTO has increased its technical co-operation efforts in recent years,  more resources from its
own budget may usefully be employed to assist developing country members. This is needed  both in
order to permit the  WTO to provide leadership in  international co-ordination of technical assistance
efforts,  and  in  order  to  provide support in  areas in  which the  WTO  has particular expertise  and
responsibilities.
viTRADE POLICY AND MARKET ACCESS  ISSUES  FOR DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
I.  Introduction
As developing countries  approach the new millennium,  policies and attitudes about integration  into
the multilateral trading system differ. In many countries,  the rapid expansion  of international  trade over the
1990's has created a solid domestic base in support of liberal trade regimes. In others, especially  the Least
Developed Countries (LDC) and  many in Africa, which are still only marginally integrated into the
multilateral trading system, policies and attitudes are clouded with uncertainty.  The Asian crisis has
heightened government concerns about the impact of globalization on fragile economies with pervasive
poverty.  Many  developing countries have also  questioned whether aspects of  the Uruguay Round
Agreements  (URA) of interest to them have been implemented  consistently with the intent and expectations
they had at the time of the agreements; and whether further commitments to  liberalize trade can be
supported by their weak domestic institutions. Finally, there are different emphases in the thrust of future
integration  efforts, as between  regional and multilateral  approaches.
In this global environment, developing countries are participating in a series of important trade
negotiations, some of which are already under way and some of which will start by the year 2000.  First,
there are the WTO negotiations  on agriculture  and services already scheduled to start in 1999 - 2000 which
will involve all developing  countries.members  of the WTO; and there is still the open question as to whether
a wider set of trade negotiations  will be launched  by the WTO starting in 2000 and beyond and what will be
its focus. At the same time, there are several negotiations  involving  groups of developing countries, such as
those between the ACP countries and their EU partners, and regional arrangements among developing
countries, such as MERCOSUR  and SADEC.
As developing countries are approaching  these negotiations in the currently unsettled intemational
environment, it would seem useful to take stock of where they stand in terms of their integration into the
multilateral trading system.  This study attempts such a stock taking after several years of implementationof the URA.  It focuses on two important dimensions of integration in the international trading system:
developing  countries' own trade policies and issues  of market access for trade in goods.
The study has two main objectives:  (a) to review and analyse  trade policies and institutions of
developing  countries and conditions of market access in their main trading partners; (b) to use the results of
the analysis in the development of a future agenda of topics for negotiation in the WTO as well as initiatives
by the international  community  and the developing  countries aimed at their more effective integration in the
intemnarional  economy.
-Trade  policies and market access issues for developing countries have been extensively analy  sed in
the aftermath of the URA  (Martin aL,J  Winters, 1996; Finger et.al., 1996; UNCTAD/WTO, 1997; Drabek
and Laird 1998; Finger and Schuknecht, 1999). The major innovation of this study is that it is based on a
systematic review of the detailed information contained in Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) of developing
countries prepared for GATT/WTO.  The analysis utilises information from 61 TPRs prepared for 42
developing economies over the period 1989-1998' In-addition,  the study updates trade policy information,
e.g. regarding applied tariffs, and market access issues, such as  anti-dumping,  based on more recent WTO
,;otifications.
The main objective of the TPR mechanism is to " contribute to improved adherence by all WTO
Members to rules, disciplines and commitments under the Multilateral Trade Agreements by achieving
greater transparency and understanding  of the trade policies and practices  of members" (WTO, 1995, p 434).
The reviews contain a significant body of detailed information  on policies and institutions affecting both
imports and exports on a consistent basis and over time which has been reviewed and discussed by the
country and the WTO Members (and previously, the GATT Contracting Parties) and can therefore be
2considered accurate and authoritative, but which has not been hitherto systematically analysed.2 While
various aspects of the TPR could be strengthened,  (Keesing, 1998),  There is little dispute over the accuracy
of the information  they contain. For  the countries for which only a GATT period TPR was available (i.e.
before 1995) however, it has been necessary  to update the TPR information based on recent country
notifications, e.g. regarding tariffs, which contain URA commitments.  In others, such as antidumping
measures or LDC problems, different and more complete data exist in the WTO and have been used to
supplement TPR based infornation.  In still others, for example market access issues, additional outside
sources have been used, mainly from the OECD.
The group of developing countries on which the study is based includes thirteen developing
economies from Latin America and the Caribbean, thirteen from  Asia and  the Pacific, eleven from
Sub-Sahara  Africa and five from Europe,  Middle-East  and North Africa. A detailed list of the countries can
be found in the Appendix Table A-  1. They account for the bulk of the trade of developing members of the
WTO (see below). The main limitation  of the group of developing  countries  on which the study is primarily
based is that it contains only four least developed  countries (Bangladesh,  Benin, Uganda and Zambia) out of
a total of 29 which are members of the WTO. On the other hand, the study has used information regarding
the challenges least developed countries face in integrating into the multilateral system developed in the
context of the assessments of trade-related  technical assistance needs prepared for 38 LDCs in 1997-1998
(WT/COMTD/IFI-38, 1997-1998).  Also, the analysis is limited to  merchandise trade only, excluding
services,  partly in order to make the scope of the project more manageable  and partly because the TPRs did
not cover services before  the establishment  of the WTO.
[By  the end  of 1998,  TPRs  had  been  prepared  for  47 developing  economies,  members  of the WTO.  Five  of these  (Burkina  Paso,
Jamaica,  Mali,  Trinidad  and  Tobago  and  Solomons  Islands)  are  not  included  in the  study,  as the  TPR  was  prepared  after  the
data  base  for  the  study  was  completed.
2 While  several  aspects  of the TPRs  in principle  could  be strengthened,  (see Keesing  ,1998),  it is important  to recall
that there  are serious  limits  to what  can be done in that respect:  There  are inherent  limitations  spelled  out in the
terms of reference  for the TPRs,  e.g. regarding  their use  in developing  information  on  the consistency  of
3The study starts with a brief review of developing country trade performance in the 1990's.  This
uses WTO and World Bank data and covers major developments in developing countries' exporlis  and
imports utilising growth rates, shares of trade related to output and similar aggregate indicators. The main
purpose of this section is to compare, in general terms, the performance  of the 42 developing countries, on
which the study is based. to that of developing countries as a whole; not to undertake a systematic analysis
of trends in developing countries  trade performance  or the factors  that affected it during this period.
The next section presents a comprehensive  and detailed review of the state of developing courtry
trade policies and institutions based on the latest available Trade Policy Review. For the 1  7economies, for
which more than one TPR has been prepared,  an effort is made to trace the evolution of various policies and
institutions  . er the whole period 1989-1997.
The third section is devoted to  a discussion of the international environment facing developing
countries. This is based on information  developed from three main sources: (a) the TPRs of the deve  loped
countries, their  main  trading  partners; (b)  information generated outside this  project  - e.g.  In the
OECD/UNCTAD,  regarding key indicators of access in developed country markets; and (c) special WTO
analyses of market access issues  for LDCs ( WT/COMITD/HL/14).
The final section summarizes the main conclusions  of the study and their implications for action by
the developing countries and the international  community  on steps that would enhance the integration of the
developing countries into the multilateral trading system.
II.  Trends  in Developing Countries'  Trade,  1989-1997
The period covered by this study, 1989-1997, witnessed a very rapid expansion of world trade,
and an even more rapid expansion of developing countries' trade.  Between 1989 and 1997, the vallue of
country  measures  with WTO  obligations;  as well  as constraints  on what the WT0 Secretariat  can accomplish
with the limited  resources  devoted  to TPR  preparation.
4world merchandise exports increased at a  compound annual rate of  7.6 per  cent while exports  of
developing countries increased at an annual rate of 9.5 per cent.  Developing countries' merchandise
imports increased even faster, at an annual rate of 10.4 per cent (see Table 1).  The 42 countries in the
study experienced a  slightly greater growth in trade than  developing countries as a  whole:  their
merchandise exports grew in value at an average annual rate of 10.2 per cent and their imports at 12.2 per
cent. This performance contrasts starkly with the perfomance  of the 48 least-developed countries, many of
which are not WTO members:  In the 1990's exports of the least-developed countries as a group grew at
5.5 per cent per annum in value, resulting in a further marginalization of these small economies, whose
exports at present account for no more than 0.6 per cent of world exports (WTO, 1998).
Table 1
Trends in World Merchandise  Trade
(in US$ million and %)
Exports  Imports
Exports  Imports  Growth Rate Growth Rate
1989  1997  1989  1997  1989-1997  1989-1997
42 Developing  Countries  399368  865921  396712  994633  10.2%  12.2%
Developing  countries  Members  of WTO  466320  962419  456939  1091432  9.5%  11.5%
Least  developed Countries  14044  21507'  21698  32751'  5.5%'  5.3%'
All Developing  Countries  674924  1395585  658899  1451235  9.5%  10.4%
World  Trade"  2237081  4023348  2341482  4185652  7.6%  7.5%
Explanation:
*  1996
**  excluding significant double counting and EU intra-imports.
All developing countries- based  on the WTO statistical  "definition" with the following  changes: South Africa  is included  in
developing countries  and Israel is excluded.
Source:  WTO,  1998.
At the beginning of the period, the 42 developing countries had economies which were slightly
less dependent on international trade than developing countries as a whole:  The ratio of their total trade
(merchandise exports plus imports) to GDP in 1989 was 36.2 per cent compared to 38.3 percent for all
5developing countries.  By the end of the period, their trade/GDP ratio was almost identical to that of
developing countries as a whole (Table 2), as both had  grown to about 44 per cent, reflecting the greater
integration of developing countries in the world economy, as measured by this indicator.
Total trade of the 42 countries at the end of the period (1997) accounted for 91 per cent of the
trade of developing countries members of the WTO.  The remaining, over 50 developing countr-es -
mostly LDCs and other small economies, accounted only 9 per cent.  Thus, with the exception of the
LDCs the performance of the group of countries in the study can be taken to reflect the performance of
developing countries as a whole, especially developing countries members of the WTO 3
Tables 2 and 3 provide more detailed information  on the trade performance of the 42 countriets  by
per capita income level and region as well as by broad commodity categories of exports and imports.
Table 2 shows little variation in the export growth over the period when countries are grouped by per
capita income level; though, the growth rate of exports was lowest among the highest per capita inc::ome
group. Imports grew the fastest in the countries in the middle income group and in the Latin America
region.
The trade/GDP ratio in both periods was highest for the high income countries and lowest for
those in the low income group, suggesting that the degree of a country's integration in the world economy
is positively related to per capita income.  This is not necessarily the case, however, as the trade/GDP
ratio is also affected by aggregate economic size, and many small, low income, raw material exporters in
Sub-Sahara Africa have high trade/GDP ratios. On the other hand, one of the interesting facts brought out
in this table is that, over the period 1989-1997,  the ratio of trade/GDP rose the most for the low income
group, suggesting their increasing integration in the world economy over time.
6Table 2
Trends in Developing Countries'  Merchandise  Trade
Annual Rates of Growth and Trade / GDP(in %)
Exports  Imports  Total Trade /  Total Trade /
GDP  GDP
(1989-1997)  (1989-1997)  (1989)  (1996)
42 Developing  countries  10.2%  12.2%  36.2%  43.4%
High Income (4)  8.9%  10.1%  87.3%  83.9%
Middle Income  (23)  11.0%  13.9%  30.8%  41.3%
Low Income (15)  9.4%  9.9%  24.0%  36.1%
Latin America and the Caribbean  (13)  10.5%  15.8%  22.2%  27.3%
Asia and Pacific (12)  11.0%  11.4%  53.3%  64.4%
Sub-Sahara  Africa (12)  4.5%  7.1%  45.3%  52.7%
*  Europe, Middle-East  and North Africa (5)  9.5%  11.2%  30.7%  37.4%
All Developing  countries  9.5%  10.4%  38.3%  44.0%
Explanation:
*  Exports plus Imports relative  to GDP.
High Income  (H), Middle Income (M) and Low Income  (L): see World  Bank Classification  of Economies  (1996)
Latin America  and the Caribbean : Argentina  (M), Bolivia (M), Brazil (M), Chile (M). Colombia (M), Costa Rica (M),
Dominican Republic (M), El Salvador  (M), Mexico  (M), Paraguay (M), Peru (M), Uruguay  (M), Venezuela  (M).
Asia and Pacific: Bangladesh  (L), Fiji (M), Hong Kong China (H), India (L), Indonesia  (M), Korea (H), Malaysia  (M),
Pakistan (L), Philippines  (M), Singapore  (H), Sri Lanka (L), Thailand  (M).
Sub-Sahara  Africa : Benin (L), Cameroon  (L), Cote d'lvoire (L), Ghana (L), Kenya (L), Mauritius  (M), Nigeria (L), Senegal
(L), South Africa  (M), Uganda (L), Zambia  (L). Zimbabwe  (L).
Europe,  Middle- East and North  Africa : Cyprus  (H), Egypt (M), Morocco  (M), Tunisia  (M), Turkey (M).
Source:  WTO, 1998, WorldBank, 1998; IMF. 1998.
The table also shows that both exports and imports grew the slowest in the. group of countries in Sub
Sahara Africa, whose performance during this period was actually even worse than that of the LDCs.
Finally, Table 3 looks at the trade performance of the 42 countries by regional group in terms of
their composition of trade as between manufactures and non-manufactures.  The table highlights the
strong  expansion of  manufactures exports  in  Latin  America  over the  period;  but  also,  somewhat
surprisingly, among the Sub-Saharan countries, although the latter group was starting from a low base.
3The words "countries"  and "economies"  are used interchangeably  in this study-although  certain WTO members, for example,
Hong Kong (China) are not sovereign  states. The largest developing economies by trade value excluded from this analysis
are China, Chinese Taipei and Saudi Arabia which are not members  of the WTO.
7The Table also shows the very slow growth in exports of non-manufactures by Sub-Saharan African
countries, explained in good part by weak prices for their main raw material exports.  Other  studies
(Martin, 1999) have shown that a significant portion of the growth in developing countries expiorts  of
manufactures in Latin America and Asia is the result of expanding trade among the developing countries
themselves.
HI.  Developing Countries' Trade Policies and Institutions
The Trade  Policy Reviews document in detail the great progress most developing  ccuntries
members of  tilh WTO  have made in  liberalizing their trade  regimes during the  last decade.  The
liberalization has had several dimensions: (a) applied tariffs have been lowered; (b) many countri!s have
bound a significant number of tariff lines in the context of the URA; (c) the overall use of nen-tariff
barriers to trade has decreased in practically all countries; and (d) in general, the incidence
Table 3
Developing Countries Trade (1989-1997): Manufactures  and Non Manufactures
Annual growth rates
(in %)
Manufactures  Non manufactures  Manufactures  Non manufactures
exports  exports  imports  imports
42 Developing  countries  14.2%  5.5%  14.6%  9JI; 
Latin America and the Caribbean  15.3%  6.7%  17.7%  10 1  l
Asia and Pacific  12.6%  6.0%  12.4%  8.8 %
Suo-Sahara  Africa  15.2%  1.7%  7.0%  7  l
Europe. Middle-East  and North Africa  11.1%  6.9%  12.5%  9.: %
All Developing  countries  14.2%  8.5%  14.0%  9.  l
Explanations:
For definitions  see Tables  I and 2.
Source  .7 WTO, 1998:  World Bank,  1998.
8of government intervention in trade has declined. Similar conclusions have been reached by many recent
studies (Drabek and Laird, 1998; Finger and Schuknecht, 1999). This analysis pernits  us to document
them with individual  country details collected on a systematic basis.
The timing of liberalization varied:  In some countries, for example, Bolivia, Chile and Morocco
the bulk of the reforms occurred in the 1980's; in others, such as Brazil, Dominican Republic and Zambia
they occurred in the early 1990's and were then consolidated in the context of the URA. In still others
limited progress has been made in recent periods.
At the same time the TPRs help identify the remaining issues in the reform agenda and some of
the new challenges faced by developing countries. For example, a lot of the tariff bindings are at levels
much higher than applied tariffs, creating a degree of uncertainty to exporters wishing to access these
countries' markets as well as an opportunity for resurgent protectionism; while the overall use of non-
tariff measures has declined, the use of certain trade remedy measures such as anti-dumping is on the
increase; Moreover,  there  is rising evidence of the  difficulties institutions of  developing countries,
especially LDCs, are encountering in implemenfing WTO commitments in new areas such as Trade-
related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, (SPS) and Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT).
The next two parts of this section are devoted to a review of developing countries' trade policies
that directly affect imports and exports.  In each case, there is a discussion of institutional issues. But no
effort has been made to  discuss other policies that affect trade, especially exchange rate or  macro-
economic policies or domestic subsidies or taxes.  In cases  where more than one TPR has been prepared
it is possible to document the changes relatively precisely and show some of them in quantitative terns.
In others, the TPRs provide us with snapshots of the situation at the time the most recent TPR was
prepared.
9A.  Trade Policies that Affect Imports
1.  Tariffs
The simple average applied MFN tariff level and the standard deviation in the applied tariff level
for the latest year available, as well as the average level of binding, the average difference Ietween
applied and end of UR bound rates and the proportion of tariff lines unbound for the 42 developing
countries in the sample are presented in Table 4.  The table shows the great variability in developing
countrv trade regimes. Average applied rates range from zero in Ilong Kong and Singapore, to a iange of
10-20 per cent in many countries in Latin America, to over 30 per cent in Egypt, India, Kenya, Pakistan,
Tunisia and Thailand and  several African countries. 4 The simple average applied tariff rate for the
countries in the sample was 19 per cent. 5
i ariff rates also vary substantially within each country with overall standard deviations ill excess
of 10 for several countries; and similarly high coefficients of variation. Interestingly enough however, the
variability in the applied tariff rate structure of the developing countries in the sample is not substantially
different from that of many developed countries (See OECD, 1997, Tables 1.1-1.4). The main reason for
this increasing similarity is the increased variability of the agricultural tariffs in developed couniries as a
consequence of tariffication in agriculture.
The Table also shows the significant variability in the proportion of total tariff lines developing
countries have bound in the UR. On the whole , of course,  the proportion of tariff  lines bound by
developing  countries  increased  during  the  UR. But,  while  WTO  Members  have  bound  all  their
agricultural tariff lines, many developing country members have bound only a small proportion of the
4The main source of the data is the  WTO Integrated  Data Base (IDB) which is based on country notifications. In a few cases
where the TPRs contain more up to date information  on country  applied rates than those notified, these later estiniates have
been used and  are noted with an asterisk in Tables 4 and 5. TPR applied tariff information is sometimes availabl: at the 2-
digit HS classification.
5  This average needs to be used with caution as it refers to applied rates in different countries in different years, and
some countries  have subsequently  reduced their tariff schedules.  Unfortunately  the data do not permit a
calculation  of an applied  tariff  average  for the  grodp  of countries  as of a given  recent  year  post  URA.
10lines in the rest of their tariff schedules. There is an apparent regional pattern: In Latin America all the
countries analysed have bound virtually all their tariff lines. But in Africa and Asia many countries have
bound only a small proportion of tariffs outside agriculture. In some cases, e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore,
countries committed to  low applied tariff rates, 62 per cent and 34 per cent of the tariff schedule is
unbound. Their practice, according to the TPR, appears to be motivated primarily by a desire to use the
portion of the unbound tariff as a bargaining chip in future negotiations. In other countries, e.g. India,
Nigeria, Pakistan, with equally or even higher proportion of their tariff schedules unbound, there may be a
mixture  of motivations which  includes the desire to  maintain the freedom to  increase protection as
needed, for development or other objectives.
Table 4 also illustrates the large differences, on average, between bound and applied rates in most
developing countries.  The bound rates reflect end period UR bindings.  In a few cases, e.g. Pakistan,
Philippines, the average applied rates exceed the UR bound rates as these countries have committed in the
UR to reduce tariff rates (usually, in agriculture) over time.  With these exceptions, most developing
countries have bound their tariffs at substantially higher rates than those they apply, if they have bound
them at all.  Sometimes (e.g. Zimbabwe) the differences are in excess of  100 percent.  For example,
Brazil has bound all its tariff schedule but at ceiling rates of 32 per cent. For countries which have bound
all their tariff schedule (Latin America, and a few others, e.g. Morocco) the average difference between
applied and bound rates is 30 per cent.  In some cases, e.g. India, Nigeria, Pakistan, countries have bound
a small portion of their tariff schedule and have  used  ceiling  bindings with high average rates for that
part which has been bound.
Ceiling  bindings, just  like unbound rates, introduce flexibility in developing country policy,
should governments feel the need to increase protection. However,  they also carry significant risks. They
leave governments open-to protectionist pressures from domestic producers who would wish to raise the
11Table  4
Developing  Countries'  Tariffs
(in %)
COtlNTRY  V  YEAR ]  BOUND  APPLIED  SD  CV  MARGIN  % UNBOUND
Argentina  1997  35  14  2.1  0.2  22  7_
Bangladesh  1996  . 84  29  15.0  0.5  54  ._
:,  nin*  1998  114  13  6.4  0.49  101
1solivia  1995  40  IC  0.1  0.0  30  0
Brazil  1996  32  12  2.9  0.2  20  0
Caineroon  1994  80  21  4.7  0.2  59  ._
Chile  1996  25  1  0.2  0.0  14  T
Colombia  1996  52  13  3.4  0.3  39  .0
Costa Rica  1995  44  12  5.5  0.4  32  0
C6te d'lvoire  1994  13  21  0.3  0.0  -7
Cyprus  1996  43  15  10.4  0.7  28  .j
Dominican Rep.  1994  40  20  5.0  0.2  20  0
Egypt  1993  48  32  16.2  0.5  15_
El Salvador  ,  38  10  7.6  0.8  28 . 0
Fiji*  7  40  12  ...  ...  28  48
Ghana  I  993  78  17  4.0  0.2  61
Hong Kong,  China  1999  0  0  0.0  0.0  0  :52
-India*  1997  54  35  ... ...  1.9  ._7
,idonesia*  a49  38  0  ...  ...  29  6
.,enya  !944  93  36  7.6  0.2  57
Korea  1996  26  I  57.1  3.9  1  1
Malaysia  1996  19  . 9  14.4  1.7  10  21
Mauritius*  1996  70  29  _  ...  41  2
Mexico  1996  49  14  ..  . 35  0
Morocco  1995  42  25  13.1  0.5  17  0
Nigeria*  1999  117  24  ...  ...  94
Pakistan  1996  69  69  16.3  0.2  0  70
Paraguay  1996  35  1  3.4  0.3  24 _
Peru  1993  32  19  2.3  0.1  13  0
Philip  :'.-  1996  28  30  . 10.1  0.3  -2  -to
Senega!  1989  17  12  ...  ...  5  F2
Singapor.  1995  9  0  ...  ...  8  i4
South Atrica  1993  22  16  9.7  0.6  6  2
Sri Lanka  1995  50  24  8.0  0.3  26  73
Thailand  1995  29  25  8.9  0.3  4  6_
Tunisia  1995  69  31  7.5  0.2  38  17
Turkey  1995  30  1  4.8  0.4  19  f
UJganda  1996  62  17  4.7  0.3  45  75
Uruauav*  1999  31  12  7.3  0.6  19  (
Veniezuela  1995  39  14  2.7  0.2  25  0
Zambia  1996  101  16i  4.0  0.3  85  ._
Zimbabwe  1994  123  17  6.4  0.4  106  9
Averaoe  49  19  8.0  0.5  30  ._
Average_  38  14  4.3  0.3  24
Explanation:
Average  tor  100% bound only
BOUND  simple  average  bound rate at the end ot  implementation  of  URA
APPLIED  simple  average  applied  rate (latest year available)
SD  standard  deviation  for applied  tariff  lines
CV  coefficient  of variation  SD divided  by the APPLIED  tariff
°% lINBOUND  proportion  of total  tariff  lines unbound
NIARGIN  difference  between the average  bound  and  appiied  rates
Sourcc. I'TO. IDB;  *H'TO. TPR.  **Finger  el. al., 1996, import  weighted
12applied tariff to the ceiling binding; and they introduce uncertainty to foreign suppliers regarding market
access conditions which may also inhibit foreign direct investment.
Table 5 provides the same information as Table 4, but distinguishes between "Agriculture" (HS  1-
24) and "Manufactures" (HS25-97).  The Table shows that with the exception of six countries, average
applied tariffs on agricultural products are higher than tariffs for the rest of the product groups - which
include raw materials, fuels as well as manufactures.  The same is true for bound tariffs with the exception
of  12 countries which have chosen ceiling bindings at the same rates for both agricultural and other
products.
A comparison  of  tariff  rates  for  developing  countries with  those  for  industrial  countries
(see below section IV), shows that average applied tariff rates for agriculture are broadly similar for the
two groups of countries.  However, tariffs for manufactures are on average substantially higher for
developing countries.
Finally, Table 6 shows  simple averages for applied and bound tariffs as well as for differences
between the two for different developing country income groups and regions. The averages contained in
this Table should be used with caution for reasons discussed earlier ( see footnote 6) and the small size of
some groupings (for example high income developing countries) necessitate even greater caution. It is
interesting, nonetheless, to note the pattern that both average bound and applied tariffs in manufactures
and for  all the products together tend to vary inversely with per capita income-i.e.  the poorer the
country, the higher the tariffs. This holds for all sectors and groups with the exception of applied tariffs in
agriculture, where there is little difference between the average for the high income and middle income
countries. Similarly, the average differences in the margins between applied and bound tariffs tend to be
highest in the low income countries and lowest in the highest income ones.
13Table 5
Developing Countries'  Tariff Rates by Sector
(in %)
COUNTRY  HS2  ]  BOUND  j  APPLIED  SD  CV  MARGIN
Argentina  Agriculture  23  9  1.4  0.2  14
Manufactures  31  14  2.4  0.2  8
Bangladesh  Agriculture  84  30  14.5  0.5  54
Manufactures  84  27  14.9  0.6  56
Benin*  Agriculture  79  ...
Manufactures  119  ...  . ....  .
Bolivia  Agriculture  40  10  0.0  0.0  _  0
Manufactures  40  10  0.1  0.0  30
Brazil  Agriculture  36  11  2.4  0.2  C0
Manufactures  2  13  3.0  0.2  26
Cameroon  Agriculture  80  23  4.9  0.2  S7
Manufactures  79  20  4.6  0.2
Chile  Agriculture  32  1  0.0  0.0  1
Manufactures  25  1  0.2  0.0  14
Colombia  Agriculture  85  14  3.0  0.2  7
Manufactures  40  12  3.5  0.3  28
CostaRica  Agriculture  44  17  9.9  0.6  J7
Manufactures  |45  l l  4.1  0.4  F4
C6te d'ivoire  Agriculture  15  17  0.2  0.0  -2
Manufactures  13  22  0.3  0.0  .9
Cyprus  Agriculture  47  29  24.9  0.9  18
Manufactures  40  10  5.6  0.5  29
Dominican  Republic  Agriculture  40  21  4.8  0.2  9
Manufactures  40  20  5.1  0.3  .20
Egypt  Agriculture  92  34  24.6  0.7  i8
Manufactures  33  31  13.5  0.4  1
El Salvador  Agriculture  47  14  6.0  0.4  13
Manufactures  37  9  4.9  0.5  '7
Fiji*  Agriculture  41  12  0.0  29
Manutactures  40  13  0.0  .7
Ghana  Agriculture  87  20  3.9  0.2  37
Manufactures  67  16  4.0  0.3  52
Hong Kong,  China  Agriculture  0  0  0.0  n.a.  0
Manufactures  0  0  0.0  n.a.
India*  Agriculture  112  ...  ... 
Manufactures  44  ...  ...
Indonesia*  Agriculture  47  9  24.3  2.8  39
Manufactures  37  10  15.7  1.6  27
Kenya  Agriculture  98  40  7.1  0.2  59
Manufactures  84  35  7.7  0.2  49
Korea  Agriculture  60  49  131.7  2.7  ii
Manufactures  19  8  12.9  1.7  11
Malaysia  Agriculture  17  5  8.3  1.7  12
Manufactures  20  9  14.9  1.6  I
Mauritius*  Agriculture  119  18  ...  ...
14COUNTRY  HS2  BOUND  APPLIED  SD  CV  MARGIN
Manufactures  65  30  ...  .-  _  35
Mexico  Agriculture  47  22  36.9  1.7  25
Manufactures  49  13  7.2  0.6  36
Morocco  Agriculture  44  29  13.8  0.5  16
Manufactures  42  24  12.9  0.5  18
Nigeria*  Agriculture  150  ...  ...
Manufactures  A6  ...
Pakistan  Agriculture  101  71  16.6  0.2  30
Manufactures  51  67  16.2  0.2  -16
Paraguay  Agriculture  0  10  2.6  0.3  -10
Manufactures  0  11  3.7  0.3  -'1
Peru  Agriculture  38  is  2.5  0.1  20
Manufactures  30  19  2.2  0.1  I1
Philippines  Agriculture  35  35  12.6  0.4  0
Manufactures  26  29  9.2  0.3  -3
Senegal  Agriculture  30  0  0  30
Manufactures  12  13  ...  ...  0
Singapore  Agriculture  10  0  0.0  #0
Manufactures  8  0  0.
South Africa  Agriculture  38  4  9.1  0.7  2
Manufactures  16  16  9.9  0.6  0
Sri Lanka  Agriculture  s5  35  10.6  0.3  15
Manufactures  50  20  7.2  0.4  30
Thailand  . Agriculture  34  38  8.0  0.2  4
Manufactures  27  21  9.1  0.4  6
Tunisia  Agriculturc  115  35  7.4  0.2  80
Manufactures  49  30  7.5  0.3  19
Turkey  Agriculture  53  I8  10.1  0.6  33
Manufactures  21  8  3.1  0.4  12
Uganda  Agriculture  61  23  5.6  0.2  38
Manufactures  63  IS  4.4  0.3  48
Uruguay*  Agriculture  35  13  7.3  0.6  22
Manufactures  30  12  5.4  0.4  18
Venezuela  Agriculture  50  15  2.7  0.2  35
Manufactures  35  14  2.7  0.2  22
Zambia  Agriculture  118  18  4.0  0.2  100
Manufactures  80  15  4.0  0.3  64
Zimbabwe  Agriculture  134  15  6.4  0.4  119
Manufactures  106  18  6.4  0.4  88
Average  Agriculture  59  21  12.2  0.6  34
Manufactures  42  17  6.3  0.4  23
Explanation:
##  not applicable
See also Table 2
Agriculture  products:  HS 1-24.
Manufactured  products:  HS25-97
Source:  WTO,  IDB,  *7WTO, TPR;  **Finger  et. al. 1996,  import weighted
15There are a few points to note in the regional breakdown as well. First, the few Sub Saharan
African countries that have bound tariffs, have done so at levels on average much higher than in the other
regions. Also, the simple average bound tariffs on agricultural products (where all countries have bound
100% of tariff lines)  in Africa and the Europe and Middle East region, tend to be much higher than in
Asia and Latin America. In terms of applied tariffs, Latin America and the Caribbean countries liave the
lowest average tariffs both in manufactures and agriculture, but the differences among the other three




BOUND  APPLIED  MARGIN
M  A  T  M  A  T  M  A  I
42 developing countries  42  59  49  17  21  19  23  34  31)
High Income (4)  17  29  20  5  20  8  12  10  12
Middle Income (23)  34  48  39  16  18  17  18  30  2:2
Low Income (15)  64  86  75  24  27  25  38  52  5S)
Latin America and the Caribbean (13)  33  40  38  13  14  13  21  26  2 5
Asiaand Pacific (12)  34  49  37  19  26  21  14  18  I .
Sub-Sahara  Africa (12)  63  84  74  20  19  20  39  59  5  4





Source:  WTO.  IDB,  'TO,  TPR, Finger  et. al. 1996, import weighted.
For most countries, the TPRs also contain a systematic estimation of escalation in the tariff
schedule.  Escalation  is measured by calculating the  average tariff rates applied to  three  groups of
products, raw materials, intermediate products and final goods, which are consistently defined at the HS 6
digit level.  Table 7 summarizes the information and reflects the judgements contained in the TPRs: thus a
rating of "1" in the table is given to cotuntries  where "substantial" escalation has been found, involving
rising average applied tariffs for all three product groups in ascending order. Negative escalation "2" is
16defined as declining average rates as the stage of processing increases. A "mixed" rating, "3" is given to
countries where average tariffs are higher for final goods - but there is no significant difference between
raw materials and intermediates, or, as is sometimes the case, the average for intermediates is higher than
for raw materials. A rating of zero is given when escalation is low or not significant.
The Table shows that while progress has been made in reducing tariff escalation in some country
schedules in the post UR period (e.g. Korea, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand), the tariff schedules of 38
per cent of the countries on which information is available showed substantial escalation. In some cases,
(e.g. Pakistan),  countries have noted that the escalation in the tariff schedules has been designed explicitly
to promote industrialization.  Whatever the justification and merits of the policy, the facts are that tariff
escalation in a large number of developing countries is quite extensive and involves higher degree of
effective protection than escalation in developed countries (see below).
Unfortunately, while effective rates of protection were calculated in some TPRs , not enough
information was available on a systematic basis to present in a  tabular form.  But it is clear that countries
whose tariff schedules contain substantial escalation as shown in Table 7 as well as high average applied
rates, i.e 30 per cent or more as shown in Tables 4 and 5, and  high dispersion (e.g. Egypt, Kenya,
Pakistan, Philippines, Tunisia), are likely to have effective rates of tariff protection of several hundred per
cent in a number of products/sectors.
The other issue that the TPR bring out quite clearly, is the large differences between the applied
MFN rates and the rates actually paid by importers. The differences are due to two factors: first, there is a
growing number of preferential trade arrangements (PTA), usually of a regional nature, resulting in an
increasing proportion of imports coming in at lower preferential rates; second, most developing countries
provide tariff exemptions on a large number of products for a variety of purposes. Practically all countries
exempt from  duties and  other taxes goods imported by international and charitable organizations,
17Table  7
Developing  Countries  Tariffs:  Escalation  and  Exemptions
COUNTRY  J  ESCALATION  EXEMPTIONS  1COUNTRY  ESCALATION  EXEMPTIONS
Argentina(90)  1  0  Malaysia  (97)  1
Argentina (98)  1  1  Mauritlus  ...  i,x;r
Bangladesh  3  i,r  Mexico (93)  1.
Benin  2  x  Mexico (97)  3i,x
Brazil (92)  1  i,x  Morocco (89)  ...  i,x
Brazil (96)  1  0  Morocco (96)  1ix
Bolivia  _  i,x  Nigeria (91)  0ix
Cameroon  3  0  Nigeria(98)  0  .
Chile (91)  0  x  Pakistan  1  x
Chile (97)  0  x  Paraguay  3
Colombia (90)  1  x  Peru  x
Colombia (96)  T  x  Phllippines  1  x
Costa Rica  0  x  Senegal  3  .
C6te d'lvoire  1  ii  Sngapore  (92)  0  x
Cyprus  3  0  Singapore  (96)  0  x
D. Republic  3  0  S Africa/SACU (93)  1  i,x,r
Egypt  1  i,r  S AfricalSAC7 (97)  3  i,x,r
El Salvador  1  0  Sri Lanka  1  i,x
Fiji  1  x  Thailand (91)  1  i,x,r
Ghana  1  i.x,r  Thailand (95)  3
Hong Kong, China (90)  .0  0  Tunisia  1
Hong Kong, China(98)  0  0  Turkey (94)  3ix,r
India (93)  1  i  Turkey(98)  3,x
India (97)  1  x  Uganda  0  i,x
Indonesia (91)  1  i,x,r  Uruguay (92)  1  ._
Indonesia (98)  1  x  Uruguay(98)  1  i,x
Kenya  1  0  Venezuela  x
Korea (92)  1  i,x  Zambia  3  x
Korea (96)  0  i,x  Zimbabwe  i,x,r
Ekplanation
Tariff Escalation:  0 = low or not significant  Tariff Exemption:  0  = de minimis
I  = significant  I  = investment
2 = negative  r = regional development
3  = mixed  x  = exports
= no infornation  ... = no information
Source:  GA7T,  TPR;  WTO.  TPR..
18diplomats, etc., which do not involve large amnounts.  Most also exempt products used in exports directly
or  indirectly (see below section B).  This is essential in order to eliminate the disadvantages export
industries would face if they had to pay higher than world prices for inputs they use.  But many also
provide duty exemptions for the pursuit of a variety of objectives ranging from regional development,
investment in general  - resulting in duty  free importation of capital goods and raw materials - or
investment in particular sectors or industries (see Table 7).  In 1991, Mauritius, for example, collected
US$26 million in duties on imports (includes sales and excise taxes) but exempted US$150 million, less
than half of which was related to exports. ln the same year Benin, collected less than 10 per cent of duties
due, if the MFN rates were applied.
2.  Non- Tariff Measures
The  analysis of  non-tariff measures (NTM) has  three  main  dimensions:  (a)  the  relative
importance of the different policy measures employed by all developing countries in the sample, as
measured by the frequency of their use; (b) the main product categories whose importation is affected by
non-tariff measures across the countries in the sample; (c) the overall use of non-tariff measures by
developing countries to control imports over the period 1989-1998  as measured by the overall frequency
of application of such measures.
The analysis relies on frequency ratios as indicators of the existence and scope of application of
various protective measures on different products by various countries. The advantages and limitations of
frequency ratios as indicators of protection are well understood (See Deardorf and Stem, 1998; Nogues
et.al. 1986; OECD, 1997). These ratios are indicators of the extent to which countries resort to particular
measures and the proportion of total products in terms of tariff lines or product groups which are affected
by such measures, irrespective of the value of the products actually imported.  They do not necessarily
capture  the protective effect  of the  measures taken.  The protective effect of a  prohibition of  the
importation of a product e.g. in Thailand is going to be completely different from the application of a
19variable levy in Uruguay or the use of a non-automatic license by India.  The frequency ratios  are
presented here in order to give overall impressions of the trade regimes in place in individual countries,
and the various measures used by different countries on different products - not to measure the actual
protection provided to each product or product group. A detailed discussion of the estimating procedures
followed and their  limitations is presented in the Appendix.  It  is  important to  bear in mind these
limitations and use the estimates of the prevalence of non-tariff measures with caution.  These indicators
are probably more useful in tracing the evolution of trade regimes within each country over time, than for
making inter-rountry comparisons,  especially when the differences in indicator values are small.
The non-tariff measures include import licencing (and approvals), import prohibitions (partial or
total), quotas, tariff quotas, variable levies and/or minimum pricing, and import monitoring. Frequency
ratios were calculated for each measure as well as a total for each country.
(a)  The Relative Importance of  Different Kinds of Non-Tariff Measures  employed by
developing countries is shown in Table 8.  The table shows the product coverage of each non tariff
measure employed by each developing country relative to 97 product categories at the HS-2 level.  Thus,
for example, the line for Argentina shows that non-automatic licensing affected products in 3 pe'  cent of
the 97 product categories during 1989-1994.  Note that this table (and several others similar to it) presents
a snapshot of a countries' non-tariff measures as of the time their TPRs were prepared, not  a  period
average.  The averages by measure show the relative frequency for each measure used only in the 17 the
developing countries for which two TPRs had been prepared, one in each period.
The  data  reveal  several  policy  tendencies  for  the  developing  countries  analysed:  First,
non-automatic import licensing (including various forms of administrative approvals) continues to be the
measure  that  affects  by  far  the  greatest  number of  products  imported  into  these  countries,  with
prohibitions of various kinds ranking second.  An effort was made to exclude from consideration in these
calculations the large number of products which are subject to licensing to ensure public health, safety,
20environmental and other standards. These are frequently  justified.  by reference  to GATT Article XX in the
TPRs. Even so, during the early period considered (1989-1994) non-automatic licernsing  affected large
proportions of developing country imports: Non-automatic licensing was present in more than one third
of the product categories.  Several countries, such as Bangladesh, India, Nigeria and  Pakistan have
indicated that the licensing and  prohibition measures which they have used derive from balance-of-
payments difficulties.
No effort was made in this study to determine the consistency of these licensing arrangements or
for that matter, any other member policies with GATT provisions. Only 39 WTO Members have made
notifications on quantitative restrictions of which 22 are included in our study. Of the latter, 16 indicated
the use of quantitative restrictions - mostly justified under GATT Article XX.  Three members, India,
Korea and Philippines also justified restrictions under the balance-of-payments provisions of  Article
XVIIIb 6. *A  recent report of the WTO Committee on Import licensing (WTO, 1998), showed that 19 of
the 42 developing countries analysed in the study invoked the delayed application provisions of the WTO
agreement regarding licensing procedures and that  one quarter of  the total  (13) had not  submitted
notifications regarding publications and/or legislation concerning licensing procedures.
Second, while caution is needed in interpreting  the findings regarding the evolution of policy over
time because the sample of countries is partly different in the two sub-periods examined, the data strongly
suggest that the  utilisation of all  "core" non tariff measures with  clearly protective effect, such as
licensing, prohibitions, quotas, and administered pricing has declined over time.  This is shown by the
decreasing frequency ratios for the 1995-1998 period for the large majorities of countries for which data
are available for each of the two sub-periods. The only measure clearly showing an increase, is the use of
tariff quotas which is permitted under the URA in agriculture. Furthermore, the Tables do not  show
further liberalization of the import regimes that has taken place
21Table 8
Non-Tariff  Measures in Developing Countries
Frequencies in Percent of Total HS 2 Categories, 1989-1998
Country  Non-Automatic  PoiiinQuts  TrfQoas  Import  Vsriable levis
Country  ~~Licensing  Prhbtos  Qoa  ai  uts  monitoring  Min. Pricing.
1989-94  1995-98  1989-94 1995-98  1989-94 1995-98  1989-94  1995-98  1989.94  1995-98 1989-94  195W
Argentina  3%  1%  2%  1%  ___
Bangladesh  34%.  43  %-.  -.  -.
Benin  1  . .
Bolivia........
Brazil  Th02.11%  7%,  1  1  %  %  100/  ____
Cwneroon  8%i ... _
Chile  ____  ___  1%  1%  5
Colo,;-..  5%  6%Ol  7%  1%  3  6
Cos,.  6%  ..-  . - .-  6%  -.  .
C6te a r.  nrc  3%..5%  -...-
Cyprus  1%1  . . 2%....
Dominican Rep.  --..  1% ...  - -...
Egypt  14%  53%........
El Salvador  -.. 5%...  1%  -.. 1%  -...-
Fiji  .. 5% ...  . . .
Ghana  .. 3% ...  . . . .
Honk Kong,  2%  2%  16%
China  I___
India  99%/  94%  3%  1  %
Indonesia  53  31  5%  - - -
Kenya  87%  ...  ..  ..
Korea  32%  ___3%  26%  25%
Malaysia  55%  20%  4%  140%  2%  2%/  7%
iauritius  .. 9%..  7% ... _.._..
Mexico  28%  6%  1-T%  2%  7%  2%  -
Morocco  51%  13%  - -1  %  24__
Nigeria  2%  14%  9%
Pakistan  .17%/-  1  %....
Paraguay  ...  _  _  __  _  ___..._  _  __  _
Peru  ...  _...  ... _..  6%1/
Philippines  7% ..  4% .. 1%  -.  - ...  .
Senegal  10%...  - .-  5%..  - .--..
Singapore  1%  1%  1%____
South Africa  36%  5%  ____3%
Sri Lanka  ...  23%  ...  -...-- 
_fhafln~36%  11%l  6%  2%  1%  12%  2%  3%1
Tunisia  54%  ..  ...  _  .. _..  2%..
Turkey  5%  ____8%  11%
Uganda  .. 3%  ... _......_..
Uruguay  __  %  1%  4%  31%
Venezuela  .. 2% .. 3%......
,Zamb  ia  I"I  %
lZimbabwe  23%..  I__...
lAverage  24%1  10%1  6%  2%  1%  1%1  I1%  3%  %  %  % 
Explanation :
.. not available.
Blank  means zero.
Source:  GA7T,  TPR;  WTO,  TPR..
6WTO database cited  in Finger  and Schuknecht, 1999.
22since the TPR had been prepared (e.g. Tunisia) or commitments that countries have made (e.g. India) to
liberalize non-tariff measures in the future.
(b)  The Main Products  whose importation is controlled by Non Tariff Measures in these
developing countries - which account for the bulk of WTO member developing country trade, are shown
in Tables 9.  The table shows the percentage of countries using each measure to affect imports in each
product category during the GATT period, 1989-1994  and during the WTO period, 1995-1998. Thus, for
example, the line on HS product group VII (Plastics), under non-automatic licensing for  1995-1998,
shows that 17 per cent of the 30 countries, for which there are TPRs for that period, used non-automatic
licensing procedures to control some products in this group.  Country detail at the HS2 level is provided
in Appendix Table A-3.
The data show that agricultural products (Group I-IV or HSI-HS24) were the most subjected to
overall controls especially in the earlier period.  The number of countries imposing these controls has
substantially declined in the period 1995-1998,  following the tariffication in agriculture under the URA.
In  addition  to  agriculture,  mineral  products, in  particular  fuels  (HS27),  rubber  products  (HS40),
machinery, especially Electrical Machinery (HS-85), and precious stones and metals continued to  be
subject to controls, especially through licensing in a significant number of countries during this period
(See also Table A-3 ).7
7Table 17 below suggests  that the product  groups which are the focus of antidumping  actions, both in developed and developing
countries  tend to be somewhat  different and include  especially  basic metals and chemicals.
23Table 9.
Non-Tariff Measure by Product  Group
in % of Countries Using Measure, 1989-1998
HS PRODUCT GROUP  VARIABLE LEVIES
NON AUTOMATIC  & ADMINISTERED
LICENSING  PROHIBITIONS  QUOTAS  TARIFF QUOTAS  PRICING
1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  995-98
I  ANIMAL PRODUCTS  40%  14%  10%  3%  2%  0%  1%  9%  3  3%  3%
II  VEGETABLES  37%  19%  5%  3%  4%  2%°  1%  9%  3%  3%
HI  FATS AND OILS  45%  17%  14%  7%  0%  0%  0%  10%  3%  13/
IV  PREPARED FOODSTUFF  32%  11%  7%  2%  1%  1%  1%  4%  3%  3%
V  MINERALS  34%  24%  3%  6%  0%  0%  1%  2%  0%  O%
VI  CHEMICALS  18%  9%  4%  1%  0%  0%  1%  2%  1%  0%
VII  PLASTICS  21%  17%  5%  7%  0%  2%  3%  2%  5%  2%
VIII  LEATHER  14%  2%  2%1  0%  0%  0%  1%1  0%  0%  0%
IX  WOOD  14%  - 6%  2%  2%  0%  0%  2%  2%  1%  0%
X  PULP AND PAPER  22%  4%  3%  1%  0%  0%  1%  2%  3%  0%
XI  TEXTILES  24%  7%  10%  1%  0%  2%  1%  2%  5%  0%
XII  FOOTWEAR  14%  3%  3%  0%  0%  0%  0%  1%  1%  0%
XIll  LASS  16%  6%  9%  1%  0%  0%  1%  1%  2%  0%
XIV  PEARLS  34%  17%  3%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%o
XV  BASE METALS  17%  7%  2%  2%  0%  0%  1%  2%  2%  0
XVI  MACHINERY  AND  ELECTRICAL  EQUIPMENT  45%  22%  12%  7%  0%  0%/  0%  3%  7%  0%
XVII  VEHICLES  24%  11%  6%  6%  4%  2%  0%  1%  3%  0%
XVIII  INSTRUMENTS  16%  4%  3%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
XIX  ARMS  21%  3%  3%  0%  3%  0%  0%  3%  0%  0%
XX- -OTHER  MANUFACTURES  13%  7%  8%  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%  1%  0%
XXI  WORKS  OF ART,  ANTIQUES  10%  3%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Source:  GATT, TPR; WTO, TPR.
24(c)  The Overall Use of Non-Tariff Measures by developing countries during the GAIT and
WTO sub-periods is presented in Table 10. Column I shows country per capita income averaged over the
period 1991-1995. Column 2 shows an openness index for each country calculated as the ratio of exports
plus imports divided by GDP over the period 1991-1995. Column 3 shows the total frequency ratios
(Tfm)  for "core " non tariff measures ( see Appendix for a discussion of the meaning of total frequency
ratios).  Core measures are defined as those that involve quantitative restrictions or price controls on
imports, i.e. non-automatic licensing of any kind, prohibitions, quotas and tariff quotas as well as variable
import levies and administrative/minimum  pricing.'  As a particular product category may be affected by
more than one NTM, duplicative measures have been excluded in this calculation, i.e. if both a tariff-
quota and an import license are imposed on the same products in HSI7, it would be only counted once.
The first point to note from the Table is that in the "GATT" part of the period covered 1989-1994,
the values of the total frequency ratios for NTMs using were extremely high for several countries -
covering more than 50 per cent of products in such countries as Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Kenya,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco and Tunisia.  Without doubt NTMs at that time were an important
feature of many developing countries in all regions.  Subsequently,  the data strongly suggest that the total
frequency ratios have been substantially reduced, except for three of the countries (Brazil, Singapore,
Turkey) for which data exist for both periods.
Second, there is some tendency for the total frequency  ratios of non- tariff measures to be greater
in countries with  lower levels of per capita income and lower degrees of openness.  The links however,
are weak and the data need to be subjected to more systematic analysis for more definitive conclusions as
to the relationship between these variables.
8See Nogues et. al. 1986 and OECD, 1997 on the definition of "core' non tariff measures. The definition used is similar to the
one used by OECD except that trade remedies are treated separately.
25Finally, while there has been a great deal of progress in liberalizing trade, there is still a number
of countries where non-tariff measures continue to be applied to a wide range of imports. But in some of
these cases, e.g. Korea, India, countries have already made commitments, sometimes after the most recent
TPR has been prepared, to further liberalization of  non tariff measures affecting their imports  in the
years ahead.
Table 10
Developing Countries :Total Core Non-Tariff Measures, 1989-1998
COUNTRY  GDP/CAP  OPENNESS  Total Core Non Tariff Measures
(UYS$  000)
1991-95  1991-95  1989-94  1995-98
Argentina  3.73  0.25  3.1%  2.1%
h-:giaesh  0.19  0.32  54.2%  ..  _
Berlin  0.35  0.48  ...  1.0%
Bolivia  0.77  0.43  0.0%  ..  _
Brazil  1.96  0.23  16.5%  21.6%
Cameroon  0.77  0.50  8.2%  ._.
Chile  2.29  0.76  5.2%  5.2%
Colombia  1.29  0.43  55.2%  10.3%
Costa  Rica  1.83  0.89  ...  6.2%0  _
C6te  d'lvoire  0.74  0.66  ...  30.9%-o
Cypr.,  7.15  1.07  ...  21.6%
Don,  .:can  Rep.  0.88  0.80  ...  6.2%
Egypt  0.73  0.56  57.3%  ...
El Salvador  0.95  0.64  . 5.2%
Fiji  2.12  0.67  ...  5.2%
Ghana  0.41  0.59  3.1%  ..  _
Hong Kong  11.21  4.03  2.1%  2.1%
India  0.39  0.17  99.0%  93.8%
Indonesia  0.64  0.47  53.6%  31.3%
Kenya  0.38  0.62  86.6%  ...
Korea  4.99  0.86  50.0%  25.00%o
Malaysia  2.76  1.80  56.3%  19.6%
Mauritius  2.37  1.32  ...  16.7%
Mexico  1.84  0.53  27.8%  13.4%
Morocco  0.91  0.61  58.3%  13  4%  -
Nigeria  0.36  0.5  14.4%  11.5%
Pakistan  0.37  0.34  17.7%
Paraguay  1.03  1.17  ...  0.0%
Peru  0.93  0.31  6.3%  ...
Philippines  0.61  0.76  11.5%  ..  _
Senegal  0.64  0.55  10.3%  ...
Singapore  11.78  . 3.71  1.0%  2.1%
South  Africa  2.17  0.62  36.5%  8.3%
Sri Lanka  0.47  0.74  ...  22.7%
26COUNTRY  GDP/CAP  OPENNESS  Total Core Non Tariff Measures
(USS 000)
1991-95  1991-95  1989-94  1995-98
Thailand  1.60  0.89  36.5%  17.5%
Tunisia  1.40  0.87  54.2%  _  _  ...
Turkey  1.81  0.43  5.2%  19.8%
Uganda  0.51  0.23  ...  3.1%
Uruguay  2.70  0.58  32.3%  0.0°/O
Venezuela  2.73  0.49  ...  17.7%
Zambia  0.28  0.71  ...  1.0%
Zimbabwe  0.62  0.63  22.7%  ..
Explanation:
GDP/CAP-  Per capita GDP in constant 1987  USS,  US$ 000 (average, 1991-1995).
Openness-  Merchandise  Exports plus Imports  divided by GDP (average, 1991-1995).
Total Core NTMS-  Frequency ratio in % relative  to total 2-digit  HS categories.
Source:  GAIT,  TPR; WTO, TPR;  World  Bank  1998.
3.  Trade Remedies
Trade remedies are defined to include anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard actions.  In
principle such actions are consistent with GATT provisions.  The legal basis and procedures for the
imposition of trade remedies in each instance are different as are the remedies, which usually do not
involve quantitative restrictions but changes in duties and charges to address the problem as appropriate
in each case. In the case of antidumping and countervailing duties, remedies are intended to correct for
distortions that occur when exporters are obtaining subsidies and engaging in discriminatory pricing
practices which result in injury to domestic producers.  In the case of safeguards, the issue is simply
injury to domestic producers - even if no unfair trade practices are involved9
The evidence regarding the frequency with which developing countries have taken trade remedy
actions is presented in Table 11.  For antidumping measures, the WTO data base contains information
from which tariff line frequencies were calculated.  As it has been argued that the mere initiation of
investigations regarding antidumping action tends to have a restraining effect on imports - irrespective of
9Also, countervailing and anti-dumping actions are directed against the imports from only one country and not all trade-
although they may thereby create disincentives  to exporters of other countries as well. For these reasons, it is considered
appropriate  to keep the total frequency  ratios  for each group of measures  separate (unlike the OECD study which adds them
up for each country; see OECD, 1997,  Table 5.1 ).
27the final disposition of the case (Finger 1993; OECD, 1997), the main indicator used is the number of
anti-dumping investigations that had been initiated as of the time  of the  TPR.  For safeguards and
countervailing, the actions were  so infrequent , that the data shown refer to  the number of specific
products, usually narrowly defined, on which there were either affirmative actions in place or (in going
investigations as of the time of the most recent TPR, using both TPR data and WTO notification ;.  Thus,
while the two sets of data in Table  11 are not directly comparable, the frequency of safeguard and
countervailing actions is likely to be much smaller than those for anti-dumping.
The data verify and provide detail on the well known increasing use of antidumping actions,
especially by higher middle income developing countries and the emergence of antidumping as the
Table 11
Trade Remedies by Developing Countries, 1989-1998
(in % and Number of Products)
COUNTRY  Antidumping*  Countervailing  Safeguards"
(1)  (2)  (3)
1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98
Argentina  0.70%  1.12%  2  3  2
Bangladesh  L  I  I
Benin  _  _  _  _  .
Bolivia  _  |  r
Brazil  1.28%  0.54%  2  2  1
Cameroon
Chile  0.01%  0.74%  2  5
Colombia  0.14%°
Costa  Rica  0.23%
C6te d'lvoire
Cyprus  X  =  ________
Dominican  Rep.
Egypt  x  _
El  Salvador
Fiji  _  .
Ghana
Hong  Kong,  China
India  0.07%  0.72%°_
Indonesia  0.16%°/
Kenya
Korea  0.27%  0.53%  3
Malaysia  _  0.16%°  _
Mauritius
Mexico  16.31%  28.12%  _  31
Morocco
28COUNTRY  Antidumping'  Countervailing  Safeguards
(1)  (2)  (3)
1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98
Pakistani_
Paraguay  .
Poru  0.05%  3.50%  .
Philippines  0.06%  0.51%
Seegal= 
Singapore  0.02%
South  Africa  0.76%°
Sn  Lanka
Thailand  0.05%  0.05%
Tunisia.  __
Turkey  0.45%  0.22%  _
Uganda
Uruguay




*  Investigations  based on WTO database. Frequency  ratio relative  to total tariff lines
**  Number of Products,  based on TPR's and WTO notifications
x = 2 tariff lines
Blanks means  zero
**  Source: GA1T, TPR;  wTO, TPR; WTO. Antidumping  Measures  Database.
most frequent used remedy both by developed and developing countries (Miranda et. al.1998; Finger and
Schuknecht, 1999). The countries in our sample taking such action increased from 11 in the period 1989-
1994 to 18 in 1995-1998. They include most of the developing country members of the WTO which have
taken anti-dumping actions.) 0 The Table also shows that only four developing countries out of the 42 in
our sample have used safeguard actions and only six countries have taken countervailing actions, mostly
in the period since 1994; and in each instance affecting only a few isolated products.
The average frequency ratio for anti-dumping actions taken by developing countries, which had
taken action in both periods, also increased over the period, from an average of 1.75 per cent of tariff lines
to 3.29 per cent.  Despite increases in anti-dumping actions by developing countries, a comparison with
Table  10 and Table  A-2  in the  Appendix (keeping in mind some  of the  methodological and  data
° 0Recent  notifications  for 1998  suggest  that  the number  is increasing.  In addition  to the countries  above,  Guatemala,  Trinidad  and
Tobago,  Nicaragua,  Equador  and Panama  have  initiated  investigations  since  1996,  the last three  for the first  time in 1997-
1998,  (WTO, 1999a).
29differences) suggests that  anti-dumping actions still continue to affect less product categories and tariff
lines than non-tariff measures such as  licensing.  This conclusion is reinforced if one  considers the
number of deveJoping countries and products on which provisional and definite measures are taken -
which is typically significantly smaller than that for investigations.
Among developing countries, anti-dumping is, for the most part, a middle and higher income
developing country practice.  With the exception of India, all developing countries taking antidumping
action had per capita income in 1996 of more than US$785. It is interesting to note that these seventeen
countries (with one exception, Pakistan) are the countries which have initiated trade complaints using the
WTO. Dispute  Settlement Mechanism  (DSM) and  more  broadly can  be  considered  as  among  the
developing countries most fully integrated in the WTO (Michalopoulos, 1999).
Mexico is the developing country that has used anti-dumping actions affecting by far the largest
number of product lines (16 per cent of its total tariff lines in the early period and 28 per cent in Jhe later
one).  The main reason for this increased frequency was not primarily that Mexico took more AD actions
more frequently in the latter period; but rather that when it did, it applied antidumping measures across
broad categories of products - i.e all the tariff  lines in  several whole  HS2 product groups,  such as
textiles.'"
B  Trade Policies Affecting Exports
There are clear links between country trade policies that affect their exports and those that affect
their imports:  For example, measures which control exports of raw materials that are used as inputs into
domestic  industries  introduce  distortions  in  resource allocation  in  much  the  same  way  as  import
protection of that industry.  Similarly, the imposition of measures that restrict the quantity and increase
30the domestic price of imports, may adversely affect the profitability of exports and lead countries to take
offsetting measures in  favour of exporters.1 2 Thus, it is not surprising to  find that over the period
reviewed, developing countries liberalized their policies affecting exports in much the same direction as
they liberalized policies affecting imports.
Developing country policies towards their exports are characterised by two broad tendencies:
Countries have tended to impose controls and taxes on their exports of primary products and foodstuffs;
while they have tended to provide incentives and subsidies to their exports of manufactures. The controls
and taxation of  exports of primary products has been driven by two sets of considerations:  First, to
capture some of the rents from the production and sale of raw materials; second, to provide incentives to
industrialization by taxing the exportation of raw material and other inputs, and thereby make them
available to domestic industries at lower than world prices.  For foodstuffs, the main justification is the
promotion of food security. Manufacturing or, more broadly, non-traditional exports (some of which may
involve processed agricultural or related products) are being provided with incentives because they are
believed to  contribute to  long  terrn growth and  development - and because it  is felt that,  without
government assistance, developing country exporters would face difficulties in breaking into foreign
markets due to externalities of various kinds.  Also, some so called "incentives" amount to no more than
government efforts to offset the disincentives  to non-traditional exports created by the import regime.
I.  Measures Which Tend to Tax or Regulate Exports
Table 12 shows the frequency in developing country use of different kinds of policy measures to
tax or regulate their exports. It is constructed much like the tables on imports and shows the frequency of
use of different measures by various countries in snapshots at two time periods.  The frequencies are
'As  with  all  other  aspects  of  this  study,  no  inference  should  be drawn  about  the  compatibility  of  the  measures  taken  with  GATr
provisions.  It should  be noted  however,  that the  anti-dumping  measures  taken  by Mexico  and several  other  countries  have
been increasingly  directed against imports  from non-WTO members.
'2The broad theoretical point is covered in the so called Lemner  symmetry  theorem on the equivalence of import  and export taxes
(Lemer, 1936).
31defined in termns  of the proportion of total product groups at the HS2 level which may contain products
taxed or regulated by different measures in different countries.  The measures include export taxes or
similar levies, minimum export prices, non-automatic export licensing (or approval), export proh ibitions
(total or partial) and export quotas.
Just as with respect to imports, non-automatic licensing procedures are the most commonly used
measure, with export levies the next most important.  The variation among countries, especially during
the earlier period is rather large, with some countries, such as Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico ;id  the
Philippines controlling more than 20 per cent of  export product groups through  licensing or  other
approval procedures, while many others limit such licensing only to the implementation of health and
safety standards, environmental obligations etc.' 3
As with imports though, it appears that the frequency of use of these measures declined over time.
This seems almost certain to be the case with respect to export licensing.  On the other hand, it appears
that export taxation increased slightly on average in countries for which information is available in both
periods.  With respect to the other measures, the results are ambiguous and are affected by the inw:lusion
of different countries in the measures during the different periods.
The data also permit a broad analysis of the product groups most likely to be affected by export
regulation or taxation. Table 13 shows the proportion of the total countries in each of the two sub-periods
which applied different types of export measures by product group.  The purpose of the table is to show
which are the product groups which developing countries tend to tax or regulate most frequently. Thus,
subjected such products to export licensing in the 1989-1994 sample. Details by the specific number of
ust  like  the  estimates  of non-automatic  licensing  affecting  imports,  the  analysis  has  attempted  to exclude  licensing  %hich  the
authorities  state  they  undertake  in order  to meet  health,  environmental  and  safety  standards,  national  security  reasons  or the
implementation  of voluntary  export  restraints  negotiated  with  developed  countries  or the  implementation  of the  Agreement
on Textiles  and Clothing  (ATC).
32Table 12
Developing Countries' Tr-ade  Policies Affecting Export
Frequencies  in % of Total 2-Digit HS Categories Affected by Each Measure'
Export  Levies  Minimum  Export  Export  Licensing  Export  Export Quotas
Country  ~~~~~~~~~~~Prices  Prohibitions
1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98
Argentina  1%  2%  1  %  1%
Bangladesh  3%  ..  1%  ..  20%/  ..  9%  ..  1%..
Benin  ..  3%  ...  1%  ..  2%
Bolivia  ...  .. 1%....
Brazil  2%  3%  1%  29%  2%  1%  3%  3%-
Cameroon  6%  ...  ...  3%  . 1%  ...  2%..
Chile
Colombia  1%  3%  2%  3%  2%  I%  I %/  1%
Costa Rica  ..  4%  ...  I1%  ...  ...  ..  1%
C6te dilvoire  5%....  9%  ..  2%  ...  ...  3%
Cyprus  ...  ..
Dominican  Rep.  ...  ...-.  ..  1%
Egypt  I1%  ...  ...  I1%  4%  3%
El Salvador  .... 1%  I%
Fiji  2%  ...  7%
Ghana-  I%  24%  ...  3%  1
Honk  Kong, China  1%
India  1%  13%  4%  1%  10%  9%  2%  3%  4%  5%-
Indonesia  6%  5%  -- 33%  19 0h0  6%  3%
Kenya  10%  .....  16%  ...  ..
Korea  ~42%-.  4%1
Malaysia  9%  20%  15%  35%
Mauritius  1  %  ...  ...  4%  ..  3%0a  .
Mexico  3%  14%  24%  7%  9%
Morocco  2%  2%  5%  2%  2%
Nigeria  I  %  I1%  2%  2%  5%  5%  I1%
Pakistan  21%  ..  3%  ..  20%  ..  13%  ..  .
Paraguay  .....  6%  ...  1%  ..  1%
Peru  ...  ---  1%
Philippines  26%  ...  ..  15%..
Senegal  10/  ..  30/  4%..
Singapore  1%  6%  2%
South Africa  2%  2%  19%  8%  2%  1%
SriLanka  ..  6%  ...  1%  7%  ...  1%
Thailand  3%  4%  2%  11%  8%  4%  1%
Tunisia  1%  .....  2%  ...  1%..
Turkey  4%  2%  1%  3%  1%  1%
Uganda  ..  1%  ...  2%  4..  4
Uruguay  5%  3%____
Venezuela  2%  ...  7.....  1%
Zambia  ...  ...  1%  ....




Source:  GAiT,  TPR;  WTO,  TPR..
3  3countries at the HS-2  level are presented in Appendix Table A-4.  The TPRs suggest that  usually a
combination of measures - sometimes a quantitative measure, such as a license in combination with a
price linked measure, such as an export levy - would be used.  It was not possible, however, to develop
aggregate indicators of export restraint which excluded duplicative measures.
Nevertheless,.  a rather crude adding up of the number of countries and measures that are im  posed
by product group shows that the five most frequently regulated/taxed product groups of exports by
developing countries in 1989  - 1994, at the HS-2 level, were live animals, coffee and tea, fuels, hide:s  and
skins and cotton (See Appendix Table A-4). The list was identical in 1995-1998,  except that, at the HS2
level, wood and wood products substituted for cotton. Again, without more detailed analysis, the findings
regarding which exports are being regulated/taxed lends support to the conclusion that there are two main
motivations for export restrictions: (a) to gain revenue from taxation; and (b) to promote the development
of downstream manufacturing activities using domestically produced raw materials as inputs. But these
results should not be used to draw inferences about the restrictiveness of the measures or the impact of the
t.xport regulation or controls on the volume or value of developing country exports.
34Table 13
Non-Tariff Measure by Product  Group
in % of Countries Using Measure, 1989-1998
PRODUCT  GROUP  EXPORT TAXES/LEVIES  MINIMUM  EXPORT  EXPORT  EXPORT  PROHIBITIONS  EXPORT
PRICES  LICENSING  _____  QUOTAS
1989-1994  1995-1998  1989-1994  1995-1998  1989-1994  1995-1998  1989-1994  1995-1998  1989-1994  1995-1998
I  ANIMAL  PRODUCTS  7%  5%  3%  1%  19%  9%  7%  4%  3%  3%
II  VEGETABLES  80/o  7°A  3%  2%  15%  9%  5%  2%  3%  3%
11  FATS  AND OILS,  O/-.  10%  3%  10%  10%  3%  7%  7%  0%
IV  PREPARED  FOODSTUFF  27  4%  2%  1%  1%  7%  0%  0%  2%  1% 
V  MINERALS  6%  9%  2%  4%  29%  14°%  2%  3%  2%  2%
VI  CHEMICALS  1%  I%  F/  0%  0%  4%  3%  0%  1%  1%  0  %/
VII  PLASTICS  3°A  2%  2%  0%  7%  2%  2%  0%  0%  0%
VIII  LEATHER  8%  I 0  2%  2  o/o  1%  10%  7%  6%  2%  0%
IX  WOOD  5%  4%  1%  1%  °  10%0/  8%  6%  6%  1  %  1%
X  PULP  AND PAPER  10/0  0%  0%  0%  9%  1%  5%  0%  0%  0%
Xl  TEXTILES  2%  3%  4%  0%  14%  3%  0%  0%  4%  0%
XII  FOOTWEAR  0%  0%  0%  0%  4%  2%  0%  0%  0°  Io
XIII  GLASS  0%  0%  0%  0%  3%  2N  0%  0°A  0%  0%
XIX  PEARLS  3%  10°A  3%  0%  21
0
N  17%  0%  7%  0%  ON  % 
XV  BASE METALS  3°  IN%  1%  0%  5%  2%  1%  0°  0%  0%
XVI  MACHINERY  AND  ELECTRICAL  EQUIPMENT  0%  2%  0%  O%  16%  2%  0%  0%  0%  2%
XVII  VEHICLES  0°A  0N  0%  0%  ION  3%  0%  0%  0%  0%
XVIII  INSTRUMENTS  0%0  0%  0%  1%  1%  0%  0%  0%  - o  0%
XIX  ARMS  0%  0%  0%  0%  3%  3%  0N  0°  0%  0%
XX  OTHER  MANUFACTURES  0  0%  0%  0%  6%  0%  0%  0%  0A  0%
Xni  WORKS  OF ART, ANTIQUES  0°%  3°  0%  0N  7  1%  0%/  7%  3  0%  0 
Explanation:
Total  Number  of  Countries:  1989-1994  29;  1995-1998  = 30
Source: GATT, TPR; WTO, TPR.2.  Export Incentives and Institutional Support
Practically all developing countries reviewed undertake a variety of policies and  institutional
measures of support for non- traditional exports.  In some cases explicit export subsidies have been
introduced.  But more frequently the measures involve policies aimed at offsetting the impact of i ,nport
controls as  well as  institutional support through the provision of  export financing - sometimes on
concessional terms - and insurance, marketing and the establishment of export processing zones (E1Z) or
similar arrangements of temporary admission aimed at export promotion. In most cases the measures are
not product specific.  Rather, the incentives are available for broad categories of products - usually
defined as non-traditional or manufacturing exports.  Sometimes, the incentives are available oiily to
certain groups of producing/exporting  units, such as small and medium enterprises.
Since the incentives are not product specific, it was not possible to undertake an analysis at the
tariff line or  product group level as was undertaken for other policies affecting imports or exports.
Rather, it was only possible to note the presence or absence of a particular kind of program and its main
characteristics.  Also,  it was not  possible to  evaluate the effectiveness of  any  of  the programs  or
institutions reported.  While some TPRs identify problems or constraints affecting the effectiveness of
.programs or institutions, this was not the case as a rule.' 4 Thus, the results reported here should nDt be
interpreted to  imply that the programs mentioned accomplished their intended objectives in support of
exports.  Finally, it should be noted that, while in general, the TPRs are a good source of information
about such programs, in some instances their information may not have been complete; and since this
information has not been checked with other sources, the results of the analysis should be considered
indicative only of general tendencies and not of the specifics affecting a particular country or progran.
14 It should be noted that assessment  of the effectiveness  of institutions  in support of trade or the needs of
developing  countries  for technical  assistance,  goes  beyond  the current  terms  for TPRs  and in any case  could  not
be undertaken  with  the available  Secretariat  resources.
36Table 14 shows the main programs and institutional arrangements reported in support of exports.
It shows that  41 per cent of the countries for which TPRs are available in the WTO period reported the
use of export subsidies (Column 3), while several others (India, Korea, Malaysia, Venezuela) are using
more generalized production support which does not differentiate as between support for sales in the
domestic market and exports.  In some cases, countries which reported export subsidy programs in place
indicated their intention to terminate them at some specific date in the future (eg. Costa Rica).  At the
same time, most of the countries have reported the establishment of incentives regimes aimed to attract
foreign direct investment geared to the production  of exportables.
On the other hand practically all countries have introduced some type of duty drawback system
(Column 2).15 In many of the countries the system is intended to cover both duties and other border taxes
as well as domestic taxes such as VAT.  In an increasing number of cases it also covers taxes on
domestically produced inputs.  Frequently,  in order to facilitate administration, the actual tax rebate
mechanism involves the reimbursement or credit for a certain percentage of the firms overall tax liability,
rather than the rebate of specific duties or taxes. As a consequence, some of these programs may contain
an element of implicit export subsidy.  On the other hand, this is one area where several TPRs reported
problems and difficulties with delays in payment and rebates which result de facto inpenalizing exporters
relative to their overseas competitors.  Many countries have also introduced*  programs or  institutions
aimed at ensuring the availability of  trade finance (as well as insurance) both for imports and exports.
Roughly half of the countries, on which there are reports of such programs, indicate that they offer
concessional credit terms.  In some instances, e.g. Bolivia, concessional terms are reserved for SMEs, in
others, e.g. Fiji, they are not.  It is interesting to note that some countries (Bolivia, Fiji) which reported no
explicit export subsidy programs also reported the existence of concessional export finance facilities
37Table  14
Developing  Countries'  Measures  to Support  or Promote  Exports
COUNTRY  Duty  Export  Export  Export  Export.  Export
Drawback  Subsidy  Finance  Marketing  Insurance  Processing Zones
Argentina(92)  2  1  1  _  1
Argentina  (98)  3
Bangladesh  2  1  2  1  1  2
Benin  0  0  0  0  0  0
Brazil (92)  3  1  1  1  1  2
Brazil (96)  3  1  2  1  _  2
Bolivia  2  0  2  1  ...  I  _  ._
Cameroon  0  1  0  0  0  1
Chile  (91)  3  1  1  1  1  .1
Chile  (97)  3  ...  1  1  1  1
Colombia (90)  3  1  1  1  1  2
Colombla (96)  2  1  1  1  1  2
Costa Rica  3  1  1  1  1  2
C6te dIvoire  0  0  0  0  0  1
Cyprus  1  0  ...  1  1  1
Dominican .-  ep.  0  0  1  1  0  3
Egypt  1  1  2  1  0  2
El Salvador  1  0  1  1  0  3
Fiji  2  0  2  0  0  2.
Ghana  3  0  1  1  0  '
Hong  Kong,  China  (90)  0  0  ...  ...  1  0
Hong  Kong,  China  (98)  0  0  ...  1  1  0
India  (93)  2  1  2  ...  1  2
India (97)  3  2  2  ...  1  3
Indonesia  (91)  2  1  2  1  1  1
Indonesia (98)  3  1  1  1  1  1
Kenya  2  0  1  1  0 
Korea (92)  . 3  1  2  1  1  ____2
Korea  (96)  3  2  1  1  1  0
Malaysia (93)  3  2  1  1  1  3
Malaysia  (97)  3  2  1  1  1  3
Mauritius  1  1  1  1  ...  3
Mexico  (93)  3  1  2  1  1  3
Mexico  (97)  2  1  1  1  3  _
Morocco  (89)  3  1  1  1  ...
Morocco  (96)  3  1  1  1
Nigeria  (92)  3  0  1  1  .. _  2
Nigeria  (98)  1  1  1  ...  0  I  ._
Pakistan  2  1  2  .. 1  0
Paraguay  3  0  1  0  ... °
Peru  3  0  1  1  1  2
Philippines  2  0  1  1  2
Senegal  2  3  2  1  1  2
Singapore (92)  3  0  1  1  1  0
Singapore (96)  0  0  1  1  1  0
S Africa/SACU (93)  3  1  1  1  0
S AfricalSACU (97)  3  3  2  1  1  0
Sri Lanka  2  °0  1  1  1  2
15  The only  economies  in which  such  a program  was not reported  to exist were  Hong  Kong  (which  has no import  duties),  three
African  countries  (Benin,  Cameroon,  Ivory  Coast)  and the Dominican  Republic,  where  the export  incentives  focus  on the
EPZs.
38COUNTRY  Duty  Export  Export  Export  Export  Export
Drawback  Subsidy  Finance  Marketing  Insurance  Processing  Zones
Thailand  (91)  3  1  . 2  1  .0  2
Thailand  (95)  3  0  1  0  0
Tunisia  ...  _  ___...1  1  5
Turkey  (94)  3  1  2  1  1  2
Turkey  (98)  2  1  1  1  1  2
Uganda  2  3  2  1  0  0
Uruguay  (92)  2  0  1  1  1  2
Uruguay  (98)  3  0  2  1  1  2
Venezuela  3  2  2  1  1  2
Zambia  3  3  2  0  ...  2
Zimbabwe  2  2  1  1  0
Explanation:
For All measures  0 = no program;  = no information;  I = program  in place
Duty Drawback  I = duty drawback  only;  2 = duties plus domestic  taxes;  3 = duties, domestic taxes
plus indirect
Export Subsidies:  I = export subsidy  2 = Production  subsidies;  3= de minimis
Export Finance:  I = Market terms  2 = Concessionary  tenns
Export Processing  Zones:  I = De minimis  2 =  Less than 20% of exports affected 3 = More than 20% of
exports affected
Source: GATT, TPR; WTO, TPR2.
Over three quarters of the countries reported the existence of one or more export processing zones
or temporary admission schemes. While a significant number of countries has reported the establishment
of such schemes, a much smaller number, including Dominican Republic, El Salvador, India, Malaysia,
Mauritius, Mexico and Tunisia derive more than 20 per cent of their exports from such schemes.
Finally, practically all countries have established some kind of an export promotion agency with
responsibilities to help in marketing exports abroad.  Unfortunately, there is little  information on the
specific aims of these institutions or their effectiveness.
C.  Other Institutions and Measures  that Affect Trade
Beyond the institutions and policies that directly support exports, there are a number of other,
usually governmental, institutions that affect trade in goods. These include institutions that ensure proper
classification and valuation of products entering trade as well ensuring that such products meet technical
and sanitary and phytosanitary standards.  The strength of these institutions in developing countries is
39important for several reasons:  First, proper valuation and classification of products is important in these
countries because they rely to a much greater extent than industrial countries on tariffs as a source of
16 budgetary revenue  . Second, the existence of regulations that address technical and other standards and
the effectiveness of domestic institutions entrusted with the implementation of these regulatiois  is of
importance not  only to the health of the population and the performance of  firms but also  to their
capacity to export abroad.  Weak domestic institutions and non-adherence to intemational standards can
result in developing country exports being denied access to foreign markets.
The TPRs contain information regarding a  number of  institutions.  But  usually the
inforniation is limited to the identification of the existence of a set of rules or regulations and the presence
of an institution. For this reason, TPR discussions  of these issues was supplemented with a revievw  of the
needs assessments for trade-related technical assistance prepared for the LDCs following the 1997 HLM.
Even so, the institutional  discussion presented below is much less systematic than the policy analyses in
other parts of this study and a great deal more information is needed to make an assessment of the issues
and constraints facing developing countries in this aspect of their integration into the multilateral  trading
system.
I1.  Customs Valuation, Preshipment Inspection
Developing countries are actively engaged in efforts to bring their customs valuation procedures
into conformity with the  WTO valuation system by the year 2000, as provided in the WTO Agreement
on  Customs Valuation.  The TPRs typically  reaffirm the  commitments of  authorities to  meei: their
obligations  under  the  agreements by  the  stated timetables.  In  many countries  this  would  involve
significant changes because valuation of goods for customs purposes is frequently based on the Brussels
definition of value.  The issues here involve both the enactment of new legislation, changes in the relevant
1 6Despite  the fact that tariff regimes in developing countries  are also more likely  to contain exemptions.
40rules and procedures, the issuance of new documentation,  the adoption of new software as well as the
training of officials in the  new procedures and documentation requirements.  Many  least-developed
countries have requested technical assistance for this purpose in the context of the needs assessments they
have prepared. While it is clear that LDCs have significant needs in this area, it is also possible that other
developing countries also have needs which have not  been assessed, and would face difficulties  in
meeting their commitments without technical assistance.
The TPRs  provide substantial informnation  on problems developing countries have faced in
under-valuation of products more broadly which give rise to requirements for preshipment inspection.
According to the most recent information  provided by the WTO, sixteen of the countries investigated had
a PSI program (WTO, 1999b; see also Low, 1995). And there were an additional 18, usually small low
income countries or LDCs using such services  for which TPRs had not been prepared.
2.  Technical Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and Phytosanitary  Measures
The reviews show that practically all developing countries had established.institutions  to maintain
technical standards as well as enforce health, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.  The information
available for  most countries however, was not sufficiently detailed to  permit judgements  about the
capacity of the institutions to implement regulations. In some cases, for example, some of the countries in
Latin America and East Asia, there was little doubt about the adequacy of the institution;  In others,
especially in Africa,  it was difficult to tell.  For example, most developing countries have legislation
defining national standards which are based on those of the International Standards Organization (ISO),
of which many are also members.  But in some cases, e.g. Zambia, there appear to be no government
testing  facilities.  Most  countries  report that  they  have concluded  many  formal  bilateral  mutual
recognition agreements on technical standards.  But it is not clear whether these agreements provide
adequate information  to their producers about appropriate standards in countries where they may consider
marketing their products.
41The  situation  regarding  sanitary and  phytosanitary measures  appears to  be  quite  similar:
Countries have established regulations requiring sanitary or phytosanitary certificates for imports o- food,
drugs and similar agriculture and veterinary products. Again, the standards used are reportedly ba;ed on
those of  international agreements such as  the Codex Alimentarius.  But  it  is difficult to judge  the
adequacy of the regulations or the effectiveness  of the institutions entrusted with their implementation.
On the other hand the technical assistance needs assessments of the LDCs carried out following
the HLM sugges, many weaknesses in these countries' institutions entrusted with the enforcerrnent  of
technical or sanitary and phytosanitary standards. The areas in which assistance was being sought 'ranged
from the preparation of appropriate TBT and SPS legislation and regulations, to actually setting up of
standards institutions, test laboratories and inspection services, to staff training in all aspects related to
standards monitoring and  implementation.  Most assessments reported urgent needs in increasing the
general dissemination of information regarding standards which would make them conform tc  WTO
regulations and the setting up of "enquiry"  points regarding standards used by major importers to enhance
access to their markets.  There is little in these analyses to suggest that other low income countries may
not suffer from similar institutional weaknesses in these areas, if onJy to a smaller degree.
In response to these problems, a variety of technical co-operation activities have been established
by the WTO, other international organizations and bilateral donors.  Some of these activities focus on the
LDCs and derive from the initiatives undertaken in the aftermath of the HLM in 1997; others are  broader
in nature and are designed to address the needs of all developing countries members of the WTO."'
3.  Adjustment Assistance
The trade  liberalizing policies pursued by developing countries in the last decade undcubtedly
generated significant benefits; but also gave rise to costs to firms and individuals adversely affected by
42import competition.  The private costs of trade liberalization  take  the form of reduced employment and
incomes in industries affected by increased  competition from imports. They are not the same as the social
costs:  the  latter are  likely to  be  lower than private costs because of the  benefits, in  the form  of
employment and income,  that accrue to workers in export industries, whose output.is likely to increase
following import liberalization (Matusz and Tarr, 1998). But, whatever their size, private costs are likely
to exist and influence the political economy of trade reform. It could be argued that prospects for further
liberalization could be affected by whether or not  developing countries have institutions which can
effectively mitigate the costs to firms or to individuals of increased competition resulting from trade
liberalization.
The TPRs revealed that only seven of the forty two developing countries had trade-related
adjustment assistance programs.  In  some cases,  e.g. Mexico, the  programs focused on  providing
assistance to firms facing increased competition from imports.  In others, e.g. Egypt, the focus was on
providing a safety net for affected workers. In still others, trade-related adjustment assistance was offered
in the context of programs with wider objectives of raising productivity or strengthening the profitability
of SMEs. In none of the cases was it possible to form a judgement as to how significant were the private
costs associated with trade reform or on the role adjustment assistance programs played in addressing
them.  In a few cases, e.g. India, it appeared that the program of assistance had little impact on firms
affected by import competition. But there was very little information  to suggest that developing countries
more broadly have the  institutional capacity to cope with the adjustment costs associated with trade
reform, especially the private costs incurred by displaced workers
It  may not  be necessary or even optimal to design adjustment assistance programs focusing
narrowly on adjustment linked to increase competition from imports. More broadly based programs
'  For a more detailed discussion  of these issues see Michalopoulos,  1999.
43and/or a broad and effective social safety net may be a better way of dealing with adjustment costs. The
point is that whatever the optimal instrument may be, few countries appear to have the institutional
capacity to deal with the problem of adjustment to increased competition.
IV.  The External Environment
The period under review witnessed mixed developments in the external environment affecting
developing countries' trade.  On the one hand, GDP in developed countries, an important determinant of
overMlI  demand for developing country exports, increased at a rate slightly  lower than longer term growth
trends in these countries - at about 2.0 per cent for the period 1989-1997 compared to 2.2 percent  in the
1980's and 3.0 per cent in the 1970's (OECD,  1998).  On the other hand, market access conditions for
developing countries improved, in part as a result of standstills and subsequent liberalization linked to the
iJRA  as  well  as  through  subsequent reductions  in  tariffs  following  the  Information  Technology
Agreement.  The actual implementation of the URA had not been completed by the end of the period
examined, nor the ITA.  But there is evidence that access conditions improved in many respects in the
markets of developed countries through most of the period under review. Nevertheless, access continued
to be  impeded  by high trade barriers in certain sectors, such as agriculture and textiles; and,  while
progress was made on issues such as escalation, the problem persisted in certain sectors, for example
textiles and leather products.  Moreover, towards the end of 1998, evidence mounted on the resurgence of
protectionism in certain sectors e.g. steel, in both the US and the EU markets.  Finally, as part of the
URA,  WTO members  committed  themselves to  take  several  explicit  additional  steps  in  favor  of
developing countries in areas such as anti-dumping, whose implementation it would be interesting to
review.18
The market access  analysis for this study relied to a large extent on analyses of indicators of
tariff and non-tariff barriers prepared by the OECD.  The focus is on market access conditions in the
44Quad (Canada, EU, Japan and US) countries which account for the bulk of developing country exports to
developed country markets.  These analyses were supplemented by informnation  gathered from TPRs of
major developed countries as they relate to market access conditions for developing countries.
A.  Tariffs
1.  Overall Averages
The results of the 'URA on the MFN tariffs of the developed countries have been studied
extensively in previous studies whose main findings will be summarized here (Martin &Winters, 1996;
UNCTAD/WTO, 1997;OECD, 1997).  Broadly speaking, tariffs on imports of manufactures into the
major industrial countries markets were reduced by an average of 40 per cent from a trade weighed
average of 6.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent with the reductions to be phased in over five years and the first
instalnent to be put in place on January 1, 1995.19  Countries have reduced their tariff rates accordingly
since then.  Moreover, in 1997, following the Information Technology agreement, duties on a number of
products in this sector were reduced to zero on an MFN basis (See Finger and Schuknecht, 1999).
The tariffication of various measures of support and protection in the agricultural sector has
resulted in substantial increases in the initial tariff levels applicable to  a  wide range of agricultural
products in some major markets.  Thus, the average applied MFN rate for agricultural commodities
(production weighted) in 1996 ranged from 7.9 per cent in the U.S, and 10.7 per cent in the EU, to 0.5 per
cent in Australia (OECD, 1997, Table 3.1).  Subsequently,  developed countries are to reduce agricultural
tariffs by 36 per cent across the board, at the same time as access for agricultural products is being
enhanced through reductions in domestic support measures.
'sSee  Article 15  of the.UR  Agreement  on the Procedures  for  Implementation  of GATT  Article  VI.
'9The EU advanced from January 1, 1997 to January 1, 1996 its schedule of implementation  of the third stage of
tariff reductions for most non-agricultural products as part of its compensation  for the EU enlargement through
the accession  of Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden  (WTO,TPR.  European  Union,  1997,  p.15).
45In most developed country markets, applied MFN tariffs for other products, are on average lower
than in agriculture. Upon conclusion of the liberalization committed under the URA, applied MFN tariffs
on products other than agriculture will range, for example, from an average of 0.8 per cent in Japan to 3.7
per cent in the US and 4.0 per cent in the EU (UNCTAD/WTO,  1997, Annex Table 3.1). But the rates on
products of interest to developing countries are higher (Martin,1999).  At the same time, for the Quad
countries (Canada, EU, Japan, US), one third of all MFN tariff lines will be duty free, involving a large
range of products of export interest to the developing countries.
2.  Preferences
The actual tariff rates applied to imports from individual developing countries tend to be even
lower than the above MFN rates suggest, however. This is for two main reasons:  First, the existence of
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) which reduce tariffs further for selected commodities and
c; untries.  Second, the existence of preferential arrangements in favor of particular countries in specific
developed country markets, such, as for example, the preferences afforded to the ACP countries in the EU
market, and the ones enjoyed  by Mexico as part of NAFTA or the Caribbean and Central Arnerican
countries preferences  in the US  market as a  consequence of the Caribbean Basin Initiative.  Also,
individual developed countries have introduced even further preferential treatment for imports from the
Least Developed Countries following the High Level Meeting on Trade-related  Measures for LDCs in
*997. For example, in this connection, the EU announced that it would extend to the least developed
countries the same duty free treatment it extends to all ACP members - which tends to provide greater
preferences than the GSP.
Given the complexity of the various preferential systems in place, it is very difficult to assess
their  overall  effect  on  the  average  tariff  level  applied  to  developing  countries  that  are  eligible
beneficiaries.  One study suggested that the GSP, "remains a valuable tool for promoting developing
country exports"(UJNCTADfWTO,  1997, p.9) despite the erosion of preferences associated with the MFN
46reduction of tariffs and the  increasing limitations on product and country eligibility imposed by the
"graduation" features of various programs.  This is because when GSP is taken into account, average
applied tariff rates would decline further in major markets as the frequency of items on which duties are
set at zero increases substantially - doubling, for example, in the US.  Notwithstanding such benefits, the
GSP as well as  other unilateral preferential schemes may create the wrong types of  "dependency"
incentives in developing countries and retard rather than promote the fuller integration of developing
countries into the international  trading system (Finger and Winters, 1998; Srinivasan,1998).
3.  Peaks
Despite the overall declines in the average applied MFN tariff levels following the URA, there is
a number of sectors and product groups in various developed countries where tariffs are at substantially
higher levels which would limit market access. The URA tended to increase the tariff dispersion in some
developed country markets and decrease it in others (OECD p.18,  1997; Daly and Kuwahara p.223,
1998).  But in all countries there are many products and product groups in which the average MFN
applied tariff level following the URA agreements  exceeds 12 per cent, or roughly three times the overall
average MFN applied tariff level of developed countries.  These products and groups can be defined as
having tariff "peaks".  They exist in both agriculture and manufactures in different developed country
markets.  But the very high rates typically have been the consequence of tariffication in agriculture.  The
main products  in which such tariff peaks can be observed in various markets are the following:
-- Major agricultural staple food products, such as meat,  sugar, milk and dairy products, cereals,
where the tariffication of quantitative restrictions has resulted in tariff rates frequently exceeding 100 per
cent and ranging, for example up to 550 per cent for rice in Japan.20
20These are estimates  reported  in UNCTAD/WTO,  1997.  It is difficult  to estimate accurately  the ad-valorem  tariff  equivalents
for many agricultural  commodities  where tariffication  involves  the adoption  of specific duties often combined with quotas.
47-- Similarly high rates for similar reasons occur in products such as cotton and tobacco, with rates
on the latter reaching 350 per cent in the US.
-- Fruits and Vegetables - including 180  per cent for above quota bananas in the EU, and ';50 per
cent and 132 per cent for shelled groundnuts in Japan and the US respectively.
-- Food industry products, including fruit juices, canned meat, peanut butter, sugar confectionery
with many rates exceeding 30 per cent in several markets and ranging up to 230per cent for grape juice in
the EU.
-- Textiles and Clothing, where tariff rates are in the 12-30 per cent range for a large number of
products in Canada, the EU and the US - although developing country exports of these products are at
present being simultaneously restrained (but on a declining basis) through the ATC.
-- Footwear and leather products, with tariff peaks in excess of 35 per cent in 10 per cent of the
products in Japan (ranging up to  160 per cent for shoes) and  17 per cent of the products of Australia
(Smeets and Fournier, 1998).
-- Some selected automotive and transport sector products (trucks in the US and the EUJ,  ships
and boats in Canada) with rates exceeding 20 per cent.
The GSP and other preferential schemes operated by the various developed countries would tend
to reduce - in some cases significantly, the tariff rates applicable to  imports of these products from
developing countries.  However, in almost all cases where tariff peaks are present, the sensitivity of the
domestic industry to imports results in exclusions of various products from the schemes or some type of
limitations either in the amounts that can be imported under the preferential rates or the countries that are
eligible.  For example, the US completely excludes most textile products from its GSP scheme, the EU
Jimits preferential  margins and  imposes country/sector quotas; quota limitations  also  exist for  non-
traditional suppliers of various fruits and vegetables in the EU market and in Japan's market for leather
goods and footwear.
48Given the  attention that the international community has been devoting to  the issue of the
integration of the  LDCs into the international  trading system, it is worth noting, that partly as a result of
the composition of their exports and partly as a consequence of the special preferences these countries
typically enjoy in developed countries, that the average tariff rates they face in developed country markets
are generally much lower than those facing other countries. It has been estimated that in 1995 the overall
unweighted average applied tariff facing LDCs main exports to seven main developed country markets
(the Quad plus Australia, Norway and Switzerland), taking account of all the preferences they enjoy, was
1.8 per cent, and was going to decline further as a consequence of the implementation of the URA.  But
for a number of products (beef, asparagus, cigarettes, processed wood, clothing and footwear) amounting
to about 10 per cent of  their total exports, tariffs in these seven developed country markets ranged
between 5 and 15 per cent (UNCTAD/WTO,  1997).
.4.  Escalation
Tariff escalation has been a matter of concern for developing countries in the context of market
access because it tends to increase the rate of effective protection at higher stages of processing - thereby
making market access more difficult for finished manufactured products - which in turn could have
adverse consequences on developing countries' industrialization efforts.  There is little disagreement that
as a consequence of the URA, the degree of overall escalation has decreased.  But evidence from a
number of sectors suggests that it is still a matter of concern.
The URA has tended to increase the tariffs for agricultural products.  As a consequence, if one
combines tariffs for raw materials and unprocessed agriculture products in the calculation of primary
products, they were  no longer  (in  1996) higher than those for  semi-manufactures in  a  number of
developed country markets (the US, EU, Canada and Norway). But this simply means that the pre-URA
calculations of tariff escalation - which did not include the non-tariff barriers present in agriculture were
biased upwards and the apparent improvement less significant.  At the same time, whereas the overall
49degree of escalation declined in all countries studied, tariffs for finished manufactured products continued
to be  higher than those for semi-manufactures in developed countries except for the US, Jaran  and
Australia (OECD, 1997).  Furthermore, various studies of specific product chains in various developed
countries show continued tariff escalation in such products as processed foods (wheat flour, orange  juice,
vegetable oils, dairy products), clothing, leather and wood products (Lindbland,  1997;  WTC,  1998,
U."  `TAD/WTO,1997).  These results should be interpreted with caution because of data limitations as
well as the continued existence of non-tariff measures in some of these product chains which make
calculation of the effective rates of protection difficult.  But they all point to the conclusion that tariff
escalation - much as tariff peaks - in certain products, though reduced by the URA, continues to be an
area of concern related to market access for developing country exports.
B.  Non-Tariff Measures
In the aftermath of the URA, it is probably fair to say that the pervasiveness of core non-tariff
measures in developed country trade regimes is at its lowest point in more than 50 years.  By core non-
tariff measures, we mean, as in the case of developing countries, the use of non-automatic I censing,
quotas and tariff quotas and voluntary export restraints as well as price control measures such as variable
charges, minimunm  prices or voluntary export price restraints.
Following the URA, non-tariff measures have been drastically reduced in agriculture, wniere  only
tariff quotas exist in a number of products in some of the major developed markets.  At the samrnl  time, as
a result of the URA, non-automatic licensing has been reduced in all major developed country markets,
and  is now focusing primarily on restraints linked to  the maintenance of sanitary and phytosanitary
standards, technical standards or protection for the environment. 2 '  Finally, as part of the URA, voluntary
21Some concerns however, have been raised  as to whether  the implementation  of  WTO agreements  in these  areas  has been
motivated by protection of domestic industries and a number of  disputes  have arisen regarding the compatibilit) of  certain
measures implemented by some countries with  these agreements.
50export restraints were supposed to be phased out by the end of  1998; and the remaining restraints in
developed countries appear to be directed in significant measure against non-WTO Members.
The total  frequency ratios for  core non-tariff measures in  developed country markets  are
presented in Table  15  This ratio, is the same frequency measure used in the context of developing
countries in the previous section but relates to the ratio of tariff lines affected by a core non-tariff and the
measure relative to the total tariff lines. 2 As can be seen from the table there has been a decline in the
frequency of imposition of non-tariffs in all developed countries and for all measures between 1993-1996.
In two countries, Australia and Switzerland, the markets are virtually free of any non-tariff barriers.  In
the Quad countries the total frequency ratio of border non-tariff measures ranges from a low of 1.2 per
cent in Canada to a 3.8 per cent in the European Union. Comparison with Table 8 as well as Appendix
Table 2, and keeping in mind the methodological  limitations in some of these measures, strongly suggests
that non-tariff measures are much more pervasive in developing than in developed country markets.
The decline in the pervasiveness  of NTMs reflects several factors:  (a) the tariffication process in
agriculture which reduced quantitative controls as well as price related measures such as variable charges
(though, of course, it also increased tariffs); (b) the termination of VERs - some, e.g. the VER on sardines
by the EU has  already been terminated; others were supposed to expire at the  end of  1998 - and
presumably will lead to further declines in the frequency ratios reported in Table 14; (c) other ad hoc
reductions of NTMs.
While the vast majority of products enter  developed countries free of non-tariff controls, such
controls are pervasive in a few sectors.  These sectors include apparel and clothing in the US, EU and
Canada, and silk and man made staple fibers in Japan (OECD, 1997, p.61). This reflects to a large extent
22  As with the developing country data, the information assumes that measures apply across the board to imports from all
countries, and is not based on transaction  by transaction  information.
51the continued influence of the ATC, which at present constitutes the main remaining NTM restricting
access to developed country markets
Under the terms of the URA, the integration of the textile and clothing sector into GATI' (i.e. the
elimination of quantitative restrictions which would otherwise not be permitted by the GATT) is taking
place in stages: Stage ], involved the integration into GATT of 16 per cent of the products (in volume of
1990 imports, in four specific categories) on the date of entry of the WTO Agreement. Stage 2, involving
the integration of another 17 per cent by volume occurred on January 1, 1998. Stage three invc'lving 18
per cent will occur on January 1, 2002, and the balance will be integrated on January 1, 2005.  In parallel,
sp.- ific quotas were to be eliminated as a consequence of the integration process and the remaining ones
enlarged at specified rates.
In  1997, the Textile Monitoring Body (TMB) set up to monitor the implementation of the ATC
conducted a  review of:  (a) the  liberalization steps members had taken during the first  stage of the
implementation of the agreement; (b) the plans for further liberalization of textiles and clothing 23during
the second stage of implementation of the ATC; and (c) other aspects of the implementation of the ATC,
including the use of a transitional safeguard mechanism, and special provisions regarding least ieveloped
countries and cotton producing exporters (WTO, 1  997b).
The review revealed that the four major developed country members which maintainedi  restraints
(US, EU, Canada and Norway) met their ATC commitments in terms of the liberalization of  16 per cent
of their 1990 imports by volume (of the appropriate textile and clothing categories) during the first stage
and their planned integration of another 17 per cent of 1990 imports by volume during the second stage.
However, they chose to  do so - which they had the right to under the ATC - by including low value
23The  precise term used is the "integration of a volume of textile and clothing products in GATT1994" which implies the
elimination  of quantitative restraints  permitted under  the ATC.
52products. As a consequence,  the liberalization  of textiles through the second stage (i.e. through 2001) will
only amount to between 18 per cent-29 per cent in value terms of 1990
imports - leaving the bulk of the liberalization to take place at the end of the period.  In addition, the
review suggested that quotas would be actually eliminated only on a few products in stages 1&2 and the
annual growth rates in remaining quotas would be small.
Thus, while implementation of the ATC can be considered to have been consistent with its legal
provisions, the manner in which it has been implemented has raised concerns about whether developed
countries would find it possible to live up to their commitment to integrate all of the textile and clothing
sector into mainstream GATT rules by 2005  24
As the value of textile and clothing imports liberalized in countries that have quotas under the
ATC has been small, the Review raised concerns about the likelihood of future elimination of trade
barriers in the developed countries, rather than about an increase in trade barriers in the sector up to now.
But as the full implementation of liberalization in the context of ATC was an important aspect of the
overall balance of commitments and concessions made by developing countries in the course of the URA,
doubts as to the capacity of the developed countries to undertake the necessary adjustment steps needed
for further integration of the textile and clothing sector in the GATT, tend to cloud the atmosphere for
negotiations in other areas.
24Some developing countries also feel that neither the commitment  regarding the consultations with cotton exporters, nor the
special considerati6n to the interests of least developed countries in implementing  the transitional safeguards were fully
implemented.
53Table 15
Non Tariff Mesures and Trade Remedies in Selected Major Developed Country  Markets,  1993-1996
(Tariff Line Frequencies in %)
Australia  Canada  EU  Japan  Norway  Switzerland  U.S.
1993  1996  1993  1996  1993  1996  1993  1996  1993  1996  1993  1996  1993  1996
NTMS-TOTAL  0.3  0.3  1.4  1.2  9.4  4.2  3.8  2.6  24.0  3.8  3.5  0.2  10.3  2.9
Licencing  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.7  0.8  1.3  1.3  3.5  2.6  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0
Non-Automatic
Export  0.0  0.0  1.4  1.2  5.6  3.0  0.0  0.0  13.8  1.2  0.0  0.0  10.1  2.7
Restrictions
Other'QRs  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.7  0.6  0.2  0.0  1.4  0.2  0.2  0.0
Variable  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  0.1  0.8  0.7  5.4  0.0  1.6  0.0  0.0  0.1
Charges  I_  _  _  _  _  _  _I  _  __  _  _I__  _
Other PCMs  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.3  0.0  0.0  1.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1
TRADE
REMEDIES
AD/CV and  0.4  0.4  0.8  0.7  1.3  0.2  0.0  0.0  1.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.3  -5.0
VEPRs  _.
Source:  OECD.  1997, Table  5.  1.
54C.  Trade Remedies
As  noted  earlier  (in  Section IIi),  anti-dumping and  countervailing  actions,  in  particular
investigations, are being reviewed in this study as potential indicators of market access restrictions,
irrespective of their consistency with  WTO provisions.  The evidence shows that the frequency of
antidumping and countervailing actions (as well as other price related controls) in developed countries
declined significantly over the period 1994-1997.  Several developed countries (Japan ,  Switzerland,
Norway) did not use such  mneasures  at all; while in others (EU, Canada) the frequency of their use fell to
less than 1 per cent of the total tariff lines.
This evidence is corroborated by detailed analysis of antidumping actions initiated by developed
countries based on the WTO antidumping data base.  Table 16 shows that the annual average number of
anti-dumping investigations initiated by developed countries fell from 160 cases in the period 1989-1993
to 95 in the period 1994-1997; although they increased in 1997, after declining for four straight years.
Also, in recent months there has been a significant increase of announced anti-dumping actions by the US
involving steel products. And there have been press reports that the EU will take similar actions. It is too
early to say whether this is the beginning of a series of actions
It is worth noting also that the share of developed countries in anti-dumping investigations fell to
less than 50 per cent of the total antidumping investigations in the latter period - i.e. in the latter period,
developing rather than developed countries initiated the majority of anti-dumping investigations.  The
use of antidumping as a  trade remedy in a number of developing countries has given rise to requests from
many others for technical assistance from international organizations to help establish similar capacity to
bring antidumping actions.
55Table 16
Developed and Developing Economies:  Anti-Dumping Investigations
by WTO Reporting Members  1989-1997
(in number of cases and %)
Developed  Developinp  Developed  As
Members  Members  % of Total
1989  _  66  30  _  69
1990  147  18  . 89
1991  184  44  81
1992  ._261  65  80
1993  141  158  47
1994  115  113  50
1995  73  83  47
1996  73  148  33
1997  118  115  51
Explanation:
* Includes  Poland (25 investigations)  and Israel (I5 investigations).
Source: YflO, Antidumping  database.
Most  of  developed  country -antidumping  investigations  and  definitive  measures  against
developing countries have been directed to higher and middle income developing countries - frequently
the same countries which have been making an increasing use of antidumping measures themselves - and
non WTO Members (see below).  Bangladesh is the only least-developed country to have been 3ubjected
to antidumping investigations and definitive measures on three occasions, in  1992 (see Miranda et al.,
1998).
The major product groups which are the object of anti-dumping investigations are muchf  the same
for developed as for developing countries:  Table 17 shows that Basic Metals, Chemicals, Plastics and
Machinery and Electrical Equipment are the four sectors which account for the bulk of ant-dumping
investigations in both developed and developing countries - although the emphasis naturally tends to
differ from country to country.  The four sectors together accounted for more than two-thirds of all the
antidumping investigations world-wide over the decade 1987-1997.
56Finally, it is important to recall that during the URA, and in the context of the Agreement on the
Implementation of GATT Article VI on antidumping, the developed countries committed themselves in
Article  15 of  the Agreement, to  give special regard to the  "special situation of  developing county
Members  when  considering  anti-dumping measures under  the  this  Agreement.  Possibilities  of
constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be explored before applying anti-dumping
duties where they would affect the essential interests of developing country Members."
There is little guidance regarding how this article is to be implemented.  In particular, it is not
clear how "the special situation of developing country members is to be taken into account."
Table 17
Sectoral Distribution  of Anti-Dumping Investigations by Developed
and Developing Countries 1987-1997
(in number of cases and in %)
Developed  %  Developing*  %
I  Animal products  8  0.6  17.  2.2
II.  Vegetables  1  1  0.8  18  2.3
III.  Fats and oils  4  0.3  13  1.7
IV.  Prepared foodstuff  52  3.7  9  1.2
V.  Minerals  T  41  2.9  1  1  1.4
VI.  Chemicals  210  15.0  157  20.2
VII.  Plastics  147  10.5  102  13.1
VIII.  Leather.  8  0.6  1  0.1
IX.  Wood  16  1.2  .8  1.0
X.  Pulp and paper  65  4.6  . 47  6.0
XI.  Textiles  95  6.8  5S  7.1
XII.  Footwear  24  1.7  9.7  1.2
XIII.  Glass  59  4.2  15-  1.9
XV.  Base metals  374  26.7  178  22.9
XVI.  Machinery and  electrical  equipment  212  15.1  . 83  10.7
XVII.  Vehicles  27  1.9  7  0.9
XVIII.  Instruments  19  1.4  21  2.7
XIX.  Arms  3  0.2  0  0.0
X.X.  Other Manufactures  27  1.9  27  3.5
_  1402  100  778  100
Explanation:
*Includes  Poland (25 investigations)  and Israel (I5 investigations).
Source: WTO,  Antidumping  database.
57The article  does  not  appear to  commit developed countries to  do  anything  more than to  use  the
"constructive  remedies"  provided  by  the  Agreement  before  applying  anti-dumping  duties  - but
presumably, they would have to do this in all cases - not only for developing countries.
The actual experience regarding the initiation of anti-dumping investigations and the imnposition
of definitive measures against developing countries following the URA is mixed: on the one hand, the
overall use of anti-dumping by developed countries including the total number of cases brought against
developing countries  declined following the  URA.  On the  other  hand,  the  proportion  cf  overall
investigations in which a developing country is affected is much higher than the share of developing
c0,0-11ries  in world exports (See Table 18). While this ratio of the two shares, Rad,  should be interpreted
with  care because the  proportion of  investigations may not  accurately reflect the actual amounts of
exports afiected, it would be difficult to conclude from the data anything other than that the developing
countries have sustained a disproportionate amount of anti-dumping investigations over the last ten years.
Rad  investigations for  developing countries had a  value of  1.6 compared to  an Rd  of  0.15 for the
developed countries for the period 1987-1997.  This means that developing countries, over  the last
decade, were more than twice as likely to have their imports affected by an antidumnping  in%  estigation
(relative to their share in international trade) than developed countries.
The situation has not changed in the last three years, (1995-1997) i.e. after the WTO came into
being.  Table  18 shows that the  Rad  values have basically remained the  same, both for  cieveloping
countries and developed, but the latter continued to be much lower than the former.
The Table also shows the very large incidence of  anti-dumping actions taken against non-WTO
members, especially so called "non-market economies" which have seen their exports being tairgeted  for
anti-dumping investigations at a far greater rate than their share in world trade. Indeed, controlling for the
58Table 18
Antidumping:  Share of Affected Economies in Total Cases
Relative to Share in World Exports
(in % and ratios)
Share in  Share in Total Anti-Dumping  Share in  Rad  Rad
Affiected  Economies  World  Exports  %  Investigations  %  Total Definitive  Measures %  Investigations  Definitive  Measures
1989-1997  1995-1997  1987-1997  1995-1997  1987-1997  1995-1997  1987-1997  1995-1997  1987-1997  1995-1997
WTO Members  88.2  87.7  77.8  73.4  73.9  63.9  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.7
Developed  63.5  62.5  38.1  34.1  34.9  21.7  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.3
Developing  21.6  22.0  34.5  34.4  32.9  36.1  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.6
Transition  and Other  3.0  3.2  5.0  4.8  6.2  6.1  1.7  1.5  2.1  1.9
Non WTO Members  11.8  12.3  22.2  26.6  26.1  36.1  1.9  2.2  2.2  2.9
"Non Market"  6.3  6.9  16.4  20.8  21.4  32.1  2.6  3.0  3.4  4.7
Other  5.5  5.4  5.8  5.8  4.7  4.0  1.0  1.1  0.8  0.7
Explanation:
R,d:  Share in Investigations  (Measures)/Share  in World Exports
Source: WTO,  IDB  and  Antidumping  Data  Base, J Miranda  et.  at., 1998.value of total exports, an antidumping investigation over the last decade was  at least 4 times more likely
to be directed against a product from a non- market economy which is not a WTO Member than a product
from a developed market economy. In this regard, the situation of "non- market" economies which are not
WTO members ( essentially China and the countries of the former Soviet Union) has deteriorated further
since the establishment of the WTO In the period 1995-1997, their exports were  being targeted for
antidumping investigations six times more frequently than exports from developed countries.
The differences between country groups become even more pronounced when Rd  values are
calculated for antidumping definitive measures (shown in last two columns of Table 18). In tie  1995-
1997 period definitive measures were five  times more likely to be taken against developing country
compared to developed country exports; and they were even more likely to be taken against WTO non-
members, especially countries classified as non-market economies. These countries, which account for
less than 7% of world exports have been affected by about a third of all the definitive anti-dumping
measures taken during the 1995-1997  period.
In discussing these trends in anti-dumping  investigations, a recent paper suggested that the reason
for the disproportionate share of investigations against "transition" economies and developing ccuntries is
that "the latest arrivals in the world markets tend to price their exports competitively,
because otherwise they cannot capture market share from incumbents." (Jorge Miranda et.al. 1998, p.67).
Table 18 suggests that some other factors may also be at play:  The very high incidence of anfidumping
actions against non- WTO Members, classified as "non-market" transition economies by the EIJ and the
US, as compared to the incidence of investigations and definitive actions against transition economies
which are already WTO Members, suggests that countries taking anti-dumping action may feel  less
constrained when taking action against non-WTO Member countries.  And with respect to so called non-
market economies, there is evidence suggesting that the procedures used tend to be more opaque and may
60well lead to a greater incidence of definitive findings than those against other economies (Michalopoulos
and  Winters 1997).
What can be  concluded from this analysis of the prevalence of anti-dumping actions against
developing countries as an indicator  of market access to developed country markets?  There appears to be
an  improvement in recent periods,  because fewer overall anti-dumping actions have been taken  by
developed countries; butthe share of antidumping actions against developing countries, taking account of
the value of their exports, has not changed and tends to be disproportionately high  for investigations and
even more so for definitive actions. This is a somewhat mixed experience in the implementation by the
developed countries of their commitment "to give special regard to the special situation of developing
countries."
V.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
The integration of the developing countries into the multilateral trading system was substantially
advanced by the Uruguay Round , which contributed to the  liberalization of developing countries' own
trade regimes and improvements in the conditions affecting access to the major markets for.  their export
products.  The integration process has been especially impressive for a group of perhaps 15-20 middle
and higher income countries in Latin America and Asia. For many others, progress has been slower.
One of the interesting findings of the study is that following the URA,  protection both through
tariff and non-tariff measures appears to be greater in low- income than in middle- and higher- income
developing countries. While this conclusion is subject to a number of methodological caveats discussed in
the  paper and  needs to  be subjected to  further testing, it is  suggestive of the  many challenges and
opportunities low income developing countries face in their efforts to achieve fuller  integration into the
multilateral  trading  system.  Some  of  these  could be  addressed  in  the  context  of  future  WVITO
negotiations. Other issues may require special action by the international community and the developing
61countries.  This section presents a  summary of the  issues as they arise form the analysis and their
implications for action by different groups of developing countries and the international commun:'ty.
1.  Agriculture
The main finding of the analysis is that while the URA resulted in a major step  forward by
bringing the agriculture sector under the disciplines of the GATT, very substantial protection continues to
be present through a variety of controls and interventions  that encumber international trade.  The analysis
above  suggests that  various  deveJoping countries face  different  situations  and  challenges  in  their
agricultural sector, which  may well result in  different  groups of  developing  countries emphasizing
different issues in the up-coming WTO negotiations scheduled to begin by the year 2000.  First, -!here  is a
number  of  developing  countries, members  of  the  Cairns  group,  with  relatively  low protection  of
agriculture who  are major  exporters of  agricultural commodities.  These countries face tvwo major
challenges  in  expanding their  agricultural exports:  (a) the  continued presence  of  high  ta-iffs  and
substantial Aggregate Measures of Support (AMS) by developed countries which restricts market access,
(b) developed country export subsidies which make it difficult for them to compete in thirc  country
markets.
Second, there is another group of countries which includes the traditional net food importing
developing countries (NFIDCs) and others with substantial protection of agriculture which, are concerned
that export subsidy reduction by the developed countries will increase their import bills. These countries
have been seeking to obtain an increased amount of food aid through the recently renegotiated ]Food  Aid
Convention (International  Grains Council,  1999) to  compensate for whatever increased costs  export
subsidy reduction may entail.  The Convention provides for greater commitments in food aid volumes,
increased flexibility - including the provision of commodities under food aid programs and full coverage
of all NFIDCs identified by the WTO - as well as LDCs and low income countries.
62While the revised Convention should prove  of greater assistance to developing countries as a
whole, and could help in a small way in dealing with some of the food security problems many face, it is
not a substitute for further liberalization of agricultural trade - indeed it should be viewed as a supporting
element for such liberalization.  Reduced protection in developed country markets will improve market
access prospects both for existing and potential exporters; while reduced export subsidies by developed
countries will reduce international market distortions that impede the expansion of developing country
agricultural production; and  reduction  in their  own protection of  agriculture (as part  of  a  broader
reduction in protection) will stimulate efficiency through improved allocation of their own resources.
2.  Manufactures
The policy issues surrounding protection in trade of manufactures can be divided into three
distinct topics: tariffs, non-tariff measures and trade remedies.
(a)  Tariffs:  There is no agreement yet that tariff reduction (outside agriculture) be part of a
future WTO negotiation.  There is however, mounting support by several countries --both developed and
developing--for  this  topic  to  be  included. In  such  negotiations,. developing  countries have  been
concerned about tariff  peaks  and  escalation in  developed country markets for  some  categories of
manufacturing products.  The analysis above shows that there are peaks in agricultural commodities and
processed foodstuffs ( which should be the subject of the negotiations in agriculture), textiles and clothing
and a few other sectors including leather products and  automobiles. The analysis also shows that applied
tariffs for manufactures are on average higher in developing countries than in developed countries; that
this even more the case, when bound rates are compared; and  that many developing countries have not
bound a significant proportion of their tariffs on manufactures.
Clearly, further tariff reduction in manufactures would benefit  all countries, because of the
efficiency losses caused by the protection to the country imposing it.  If tariffs are included in a future
63WTO negotiation however, this is likely to  involve a negotiation process similar to that in the UR in
which developing countries would be expected to make a contribution - whether fully reciprocal or not
may be depend on the countries involved. In such a scenario, the following considerations drawn from
the analysis above should be taken  into account.  First, there would be pressure for the developing
countries to take considerable action in this area because their tariff levels are much higher than those in
developed countries. They will also be under pressure to reduce ceiling bindings as well as to  bind a
significant portion of the tariffs remaining unbound in many countries. Second, as the developed c:ountries
have already  reduced tariffs  in  most  manufactures, the  remaining ones are  concentrated  in  a  few
sensitive sectors".  There will be opposition from some major developed countries to include reductions
in tariffs in thest  -nreas,  especially for textiles and clothing, since following the implementation )f  ATC,
tariffs will be the sole means of protection available to this sector.
The implications of this situation are that first, developing countries should take advantage of any
opportunities offered by the inclusion of tariffs on manufactures in a new WTO negotiation to reduce
their own ceiling bindings and applied rates on manufactures as well as to  increase the mnmber of
products in which  tariffs are bound.  This would be  helpful to their  economies as well as provide
iegotiating  leverage  which  could  be  used  to  obtain,  through  negotiations,  developed  country
commitments for reductions in tariffs in sectors where there are tariff peaks.  Recognizing that there are
few such sectors  outside agriculture, developing countries need to seek a formula for reducing tariffs
which would permit them to exchange reductions of tariffs along a broad area of products on their part,
for  reductions in  the peaks  in  manufacturing sectors of  developed countries.  Finally,  as  trade  in
manufactures is  rapidly  expanding among the  developing countries  themselves, they  would  obtain
significant benefits from mutual reductions in tariff barriers that affect their exports in other developing
country markets.
64(b)  Non-Tariff Barriers:  As there are few non-tariff barriers (NTBs)  still in place in the
developed countries, the key  issue for developing countries here has to  do with  ensuring that  first,
commitments under the ATC are implemented  and second, thatNTBs are not imposed under the guise of
-any other rules or  arrangements.  One way  in which this may occur is through the application of
discriminatory rules and practices under the SPS and TBT agreements.  The way to guard against such
developments is to  be  vigilant and scrutinize actions of  developed countries to  ensure  appropriate
implementation of the relevant agreements.  But while textiles and clothing actions are being monitored
systematically  through the Textile Bureau, no similar arrangement is present with regard to SPS and TBT
- areas in which  many developing countries have limited institutional capacities - which may constrain
their ability to scrutinize the consistency of developed country actions.
At  the  same time  it  is  clear that  some developing countries continue to  impose non-tariff
measures on manufacturing imports. These have been shown to be very damaging to their economies for
a variety of reasons including through the lack of transparency,  the generation of rents and corruption etc.
NTBs are also sub-optimal as a means for addressing of balance-of-payments problems.  There is no
difference in this  regard between LDCs and other developing countries.  These measures should be
eliminated  at the earliest possible opportunity, or, where appropriate, converted into tariffs that will be
subject to reductions over time, possibly as part of multilateral WTO negotiations involving tariffs in
agriculture and/or manufactures.
(c)  Trade  Remedies:  The  experience  of  the  last  few  years  suggests  strongly  that
anti-dumping action has become the instrument of choice for providing trade remedies by both developed
and higher and middle income developing countries. Many of these developing countries, consistent with
their WTO obligations, have abandoned the use of non-tariff measures to protect their manufacturing
sector, and  are in effect emulating developed country practices regarding trade remedies, which are
consistent with WTO rules and procedures: In this manner they can be considered to have become more
65effectively-integrated into the multilateral trading system. Their example is likely to be followed by other
developing countries in  the future.  Although anti-dumping actions carry the  potential of  shielding
inefficient domestic  producers,  their  proliferation in  developing  countries  and  especially  against
developed country exporters, could well provide the balance needed for a longer term reconsideration and
tightening of  the  WTO anti-dumping agreement provisions.  Such a  reconsideration should  aim at
reducing  the  flexibility  all  countries  have  in  granting  relief  through  this  instrument  an J  induce
govermnents to rely more on safeguard actions, which tend to be more transparent and time- limited.
3  Export Policies
The analysis above shows that developing countries have over time reduced their interventions
aimed at controlling or taxing primary exports, while bringing their practices in promoting manufacturing
exports more in  line with the overall disciplines of the WTO, e.g. with  regard to the use  Af  export
subsidies.  Nonetheless, export controls on primary products continue to  be present in a  nuimber of
countries.  Such controls and taxes  pose two dangers: First, they create disincentives to production for
export which may reduce export earnings. Second, export controls, including taxation, result in domestic
prices of exportables which are lower than international prices. This could lead to the establishment of
inefficient  domestic  processing  industries, which  can  only  survive  through  the  implicit  protection
afforded by the artificially lower domestic input prices.  A better set of policies would include:  (a) the
establishment of instruments of taxation that are neutral as between income derived from exports and
income from domestic sales; (b) the provision of support to domestic processing activities which does not
rely on artificially depressing the domestic prices of exportable primary commodities and raw materials.
4  Capacity Building
Many developing countries, especially lower income and LDCs, face significant constraints in
their capacity to implement effectively their WTO obligations in a number of areas, including customs
administration, SPS, and TBT as well as adjustment assistance.  These constraints have been recognized
66in the WTO agreements, which permit developing countries longer time frames to bring their policies and
institutions into line with their WTO obligations in some of these areas, as well as encourage developed
country  members to provide technical assistance in support of developing country efforts to strengthen
their institutions.
A detailed analysis of the implementation of these provisions and of other measures to assist
developing countries, and especially LDCs, in capacity building efforts was beyond the scope of this
study.  However, some of the conclusions and recommendations of other studies of the issue may be
useful to recall in this context.  In particular, regarding technical assistance, it appears that considerable
amounts are available from a  variety of  bilateral donors and  intemational organizations.  There are
problems, however, regarding the effective co-ordination of such assistance and ensuring that it is not
supply- driven and reflects accurately the priorities and needs of the developing countries concerned. An
effort to  co-ordinate such assistance to LDCs was launched in  1997, but has produced little tangible
results  so far.  While the  WTO has increased its technical co-operation efforts  in recent years, and
together with other international agencies has launched the Integrated Program for Technical Assistance,
more resources from its own budget may usefully be employed in this and other programs to  assist
developing country members. This is needed  both in order to permit the WTO to provide leadership in
international co-ordinatiorn  of technical assistance efforts, and in order to provide support in areas in
which the WTO has particular expertise and responsibilities  (Michalopoulos, 1999).
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70APPENDIX
Methodology in Estimating Frequency Ratios
The TPR data  permitted us to  estimate frequencies, in the  applications of these  non-tariff
measures at the HS2 digit level involving 97 product categories. Thus, the frequency ratios (f) calculated
from the TPR relate to the proportion of HS2 product categories out of the total which is affected by a
particular measure.  The weakness of this  indicator is that it gives equal weight to the presence of a
measure in a country that could affect only one or a few lines in an HS2 category, for example HS72, Iron
and Steel, with the presence of the same measure in another country which affects a large number of tariff
lines or, for example all steel products.
Formally, let  Nqm be a non-tariff measure imposed by country m on a product or group of
products q. Then the frequency ratio for that measure, fnm  =  2Nqm /YQm  where Qm  is the total number of
products, measured in total tariff lines or product groups.  Thus, for the calculation of (I), using the HS2
product breakdown employed  in most of the analysis for the Q m=97. Where tariff line information was
available, as for example in the case of anti-dumping measures for the calculation of (O),  a standard HS 6-
digit tariff line classification of approximately 5200 lines was used.  Two other frequency ratio concepts
are used  in the paper: The total frequency ratio (Tfm),  which is simply the sum of all frequency ratios of
NTM used by country m; and the average frequency ratio (Af n  ) which shows the average use of a
particular non-tariff measure for the countries in the group.
It may appear at first glance, thatf would always be larger thanf.  This is not the case, however.
The two different frequency ratios show different aspects of a country's trade regime:  If a specific non-
tariff measure involves a large number of tariff lines concentrated in one or two groups of products, f may
be smaller than f;  the converse will be the case  if a particular measure applies to a few products in a
large number of groups.  A simple example from one of the countries, Thailand, in which tariff line and
71broader category measures are available for the same year, can be used to illustrate this point:  In 1997
Thailand applied non-automatic licensing on a total of 25 product categories, involving 713 tarif-f  lines. In
this  case, f= 26% while P=l4%.  For the same year, Thailand's prohibitions were  concentrated in 6
product categories involving 613 tariff lines. In this case f= 6% while fe= 12% .
An effort was made to complement the TPR analysis of non tariff measures with data obtained
from the UNCTAD, TRAINS data base, which permit the calculation of frequency ratios (f) al the tariff
line level.  The TRAINS data are available for a fewer number of countries (22), and only in six cases was
information avaiiable for the same country over a period of time.  The fe ratios for similar non-tariff
measures as those calculated from the TPRs but based on tariff line data from TRAINS are shown in
Appendix Table A-2. Comparison with Table 8 suggests that there is a pretty good correlation between
the frequency ratios in countries which, either apply non-tariff measures on just a few products or those
that apply them on a very large number of products; but there appears to be little correlation between the
two frequency measures for countries in between.
On the other hand, when looking at the evolution of frequency ratios over time, frequency ratios
for Chile, Colombia and Thailand are shown to increase from the first period to the second, while they are
shown to decline for the same countries using the TPR information. On closer investigation hiowever,  it
appears that the reason for the increase, is the introduction in all three countries of  licensing and/or
prohibitions for the importation of products which are either hazardous (radioactive materials and the
like) and/or protected under environmental conventions (tropical wood and articles thereof); and there is
no record in the TPR of any changes in the commercial policy of the countries involved affecting these
products.  While an effort was made to exclude from consideration in the TPRs of all products in which
licensing and prohibitions imposed for safety and environmental reasons, it was not possible to check all
the TRAINS data in order to determine the extent to which they included restrictions for this purpose.  As
a consequence the TRAINS data cannot be readily compared with the data obtained from the TPRs; and
72were used only for general reference purposes,  as well as in the construction of the estimates for NTMs at
the HS-2 level for of India-as  the information contained in the TPRs for India was inadequate for that
purpose.
Finally, it should be noted that the frequency ratios employed assume that the measure taken
applies to all transactions involving that tariff line or product group and is not limited to transactions with
one country or group of cbuntries. This is not a major weakness in the set of measures being considered
because, unlike most trade remedies (anti-dumping, countervailing) measures included-here are almost
always applied to imports from all sources25
25There  are a few exceptions: For example,  Korea applied ,tariff quotas on certain items only against  imports from Japan; and
similarly for Cyprus against the EU. The measures applied by these countries  were included in the calculated  frequencies, as
at the time they affected trade with a major partner.  On the other hand, several countries impose total embargoes on imports
from certain countries for political reasons-for  example a number of Arab states against Israel. These embargoes were
ignored  in the calculations.
73Table  A-1
TPR Country Coverage
Country  GATT TPR  WTO TPR
Argentina  1992  1999*
Bangladesh  1992
Benin  1998
Brazil  1993  1997
Bolivia  1993
Cameroon  1995
Chile  1991  1997
Colombia  1990  1997
Costa Rica  1995
C6te  d'lvoire  1995
Cyprus  _  1997
Dominican Republic  -1996
Egypt  1993
El Salvador  r  1996
Fiji  1997
Ghana  1992  T
Hong Kong, China  1990  1994,1999*
India  1993  1997
Indonesia  1991  1994,1999*
Kenya  1994
Korea  1992  1996
Malaysia  1993  1998
Mauritius  1996
Mexico  1993  1998
Morocco  1990  1996






Singapore  1992  1996
S. Africa/SACU  1993  1998
Sri Lanka  1995
Thailand  1991  1995
Tunisia  1994  _
Turkey  1994  1999*
Uganda  . 1995
Uruguay  1992  1999*




*The  year refers  to the date of TPR publication  actual  or forthcoming,  not the year when the Review 'was
undertaken.  In the cases  of Cameroon,  Pakistan,  Zimbabwe,  1994  GATT  reviews  were  published  in 1995.
Source. GA7T TPR; WTO, TPR.
74Table A-2
Non Tariff Measures in Developing Countries
Frequencies in % of Total Tariff Lines for Each Measure, 1989-1997
COUNTRY  Non-Automatic  Prohibitions  Quotas  Foreign  Import  Administered
Licensing  Exchange  Monitoring  Pricing
Restraints
1989-94  1995-97  1989-94  1995-97  1989-94  1995-97  1989-94  1995-97  1989-94  1995-97  1989-94  1995-97
Argentina  5.6%  ...  1.7%  ...  0.5%  ...  0.3%  . %.  .1%  .. 0.
Bangladesh  3.7%  7  .6%  ...  ...  ...  ..
Brazil  811%  ...  2.6%  ..  ...  ...  ...  1.3%  ..
Cameroon  1.0%  ...  0.3%  ...  .
Chile  10.1%  10.3%  0.9%  2.6%/9  . ...  0.5%  0.8%
Colombia  3.0%/°  8.4%  0  .9%  0.0%  5.4%
Hong Kong, China  4.8%  4.8%  _  0 4%/  0.4%  16.0%  160%  6.4%  6.4%
India  75.1%  44.6%  2.1%  3.7%
Indonesia  13.9%  3 0%  o06%6 0-5%  2.00%
Malaysia  13.8%  ...  2.5%  .
Mexico  I 1.5%  ...  4.3%  0.5%  ...  ...  ...
Morocco  ...  14.1%  ....  1.0%/  ...  ...  ...  ...  9.3%
Philippines  33.0%  ...  2.7%  ...  1.9%  ...  23.0%  ...  ...  ...
South Africa  ...  ...  ...  ...  32.6%  ...
SriLanka  40%  ...  ...
Thailand  19  39  4%  6.5.  %  12.2%_  2.8%
Tunisia  5.6%  ... I  ...  5.9%
Uruguay  16.1%  1.6%  _  __*--  ...  ...  ...
Average
Explanation:
...  :Not  available




(by HS 2 Category in number of Countries Using Measure, 1989-1998)
HS2  Non  automatic  Prohibitions  Quotas  Tsriff Quotas  Vsrisble Levies /
Licensing  Administered Priciing
194I995-98  989-941  1995-98 1989-94 1995-98  1989-94 1995-98  1989-94  1995-95
I LIVE ANIMALS; ANIMAL PRODUCTS
I  I  1  4  4  1  2  0  1  2  0  0
2  12  5  1  0  0  0  4  1  1
3  1I  4  2  1  0  0  1  0  0  I
4  14  6  2  1  1  0  0  6  3  2
5  10  2  1  0  0  0  0  1  _  0
11  VEGETABLE PRODURTS  --
6  8  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
7  14  8  3  I  3  1  1  6  0  1
8  14  3  2  0  1  1  1  3  0  0
9  12  7  3  1  1  1  0  6  0  0
10  1  7  13  2  2  4  1  0  4  3  3
11  I10  9  0  2  0  1  0  2  3  2
12  13  5  2  3  2  0  1  3  - 2
13  6  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
14  3  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
III ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS
_51_  13  1VI  I  I  I  n  LA  4
IV PREPARED FOODSTUFFS; BEVERAGES; SPIRITS AND VINEGAR; TOBACCO AND MANUFAC1'URES
16  9  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
17  15  6  2  3  1  3  1  3  3  3
18  9  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  0
19  8  3  1  0  0  0  0  . _  I
20  7  3  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1
21  6  2  j  0  0  0  0  2  0  0
22  1  0  7 - 6  1  0  0  I  2  2  1
23  9  4  1  0  0  0  0  1  . _
24  1 1  4  4  1  0  T  0  2  1  0
V MINERAL PRODUCTS  ._
25  9  6  2  4  0  0  0  O  0  0
261  7  1  4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
271  14 J  12  I  I  0  0  1  1  0  0
VI  PRODUCTS OF THE CHEMICAL OR ALLIED INDUSTRIES
28  5  5  1  0  0  0  1  3  2  0
29  8  5  3  I  0  0  1  1  1  0
30  6  2  I  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
31  9  3  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  0
32  4  1  2  0  0  0  1  1  0  0
33  3  3  I  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
34  5  1  2  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
35  3  1  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
36  4  5  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0
37  4  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  o  0
38  6  2  I  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
VII PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF; RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF
391  7  1  3  1  2  1  1  1  0  10  1  °  1  0  i  I  I  0
401  5  1  7  1  1  3  1  0  11  _ I  I  I  I  1  2  1  1
Vill RAW HIDES AND SKINS; LEATHER; FURSKINS  AND ARTICLES THEREOF
41  4  1  0  1  0  1  0  10  0  11  0  101 
42  __  1  __  1  __  0101010
43  3  _  1  1010  0  _ 
IX WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD PLAITING MATERIALS; BASKETWARE AND WICKERWORK
44-  8  3  1  '2  2  0  0L  1  2  11  0  -
45  1  1  0  00  0  1  0  0  0
46  3  1  0100  0  0  0  01  0
Total Countries  29  30  29  029  30  29  30  29 
76HS2  Non automatic  Prohibitions  Quotas  Tariff Quotas  Variable Levies /
Licensing  . Administered Pricing
1989-947 199S-98 1989-9411995-9899-941991-98  1989-94 1995-98  1989-94  1  995-98
X WOOD  PULP  AND  PAPER.
471  4  _0  _0  0  0  0  0  0
481  8  2  1  0  0  I  2  2  0
491  7  I  0  0  0  o  0  0
XI TEXTILES  AND TEXTILE  ARITICLES  .
50  6  3  3  0  I  0  1  1  0  0
51  5  3  2  0  0  0  1  0  2  0
52  8  2  4  0  0  0  1  1  1  0
53  9  3  2  1  0  0  1  0  1  0
54  7  1  2  0  0  0  0  1  0  0
55  8  2  3  0  0  0  0  2  0
56  8  2  3  0  0  1  0  0  2  0
57  3  i  3  0  0  i  0  0  2  0
58  6  1  3  0  0  1  0  1  2  0
59  5  1  2  0  0  1  0  0  2  0
60  6  1  3  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
61  7  1  3  0  0  2  0  1  2  0
62  7  1  3  0  0  2  0  0  2  0
63  I  7  4  2  0  1  0  1  2  0
XII  FOOTWEAR,  HEADGEAR,  UMBRELLAS
645  1  2  0  10  0I  1  0
65  4  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
66  4  1  1  0  _ 
67  3  i  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
XIII ARTICLES  OF STONE, PLASTER, CEMENT, ASBESTOS,_GLASS  AND GLASSWARE
68(4  2  4  1  0  0  0  0  JO0
69  3  1  T 2  00  [  0  0I__  JI  0
70[  7  2  1  2  0  1  0  00  1  1  1  0
XIV  NATURAL OR CULTURED PEARLS. PRECIOUS OR SEMI-PRECIOUS STONES, PRECIOUS METALS
711  10  1  5  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0
XV BASE METALS AND ARTICLES OF BASE METAL___
72  6  3  0  2  1  0  1  1  1  0
73  6  2  2  I~  0  0  ___  1  2  o
.74  4  3  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  0
75  4  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
76  5  2  0  0  0  0  0  2  1  0
78  3  2  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0
79  4  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
80  4  2  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0
81  4  2  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
82  9  3  2  0  0  0  0  0°  1 
831  5  1  0  0  0  0  2.  - 1  0
XVI MACHINERY AND MECHANICAL APPLIANCES; ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT AND PARTS THEREOF
- 841  11  1  6  1  3  -1  3  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  2  1  0
851  1  5  1  7  1  4  1  1  1  _0  I  0  1  0  1  1  1  2  1  0
XVII MOTOR  VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT, AND OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
861 5  1  1  0  0  1  1  |  0  |  0  |  0
871  13  1  9  4  _7  3  2  0  0  3  1  0
881  5  1-  2  1  01  0  1  0  0  1  0  11  0
891  5  1  1  3  1I  -
XVIII OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC, CINEMATOGRAPHIC INSTRUMENTS & APPARATUS; CLOCKS & WATCHES.
901  7  1  3  1  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  °
I  ~~~~~911  3  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
921  4  1  0  I  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0
XIX ARMS AND AMMUNITION AND PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF  I
931  6  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  1  _  0  _  0
XX MISCELLANEOUS  MANUFACTURED  ARTICLES  I  ____I
94  2  2  121  0  _  0_0_0_  00  _  0
95  6  3  {  2  J  1  0  _  °  _  °__°__°__
96  3  1 ___  __  101  0  _  _  _  _  _I7
77HS2  Non automatic  Prohibitions  Quotas  Tariff Quotas  Variable Leves I
Licensing  Administered Pricing
1989-94  199-,98  1989-94 1995-98  1989-94i 1995-98  1989-94j1]995-98 1989-94  1995-9-
XXI WORKS OF ART, COLLECTORS' PIECES AND ANTIQUES
971  3  1  1  1  0  0  1  0o  1  0  o  0  1  0 1  0
Total countriesi  291  301  291  301  291  301  291  30  29  30
Source:  GA77,  TPR;  WTO, TPR.
Table A4
Developing Countries Trade Policies Affecting Exports
(by HS Categories in number of Countries Measure)
HS2  Export Levies  Minimum Export  Export Licensing  Export Prohibitions  Export Quotas
I  Prices
1989-94 1 1995-98  9I1989-9  95-98  1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1995-98  1989-94  1994-98
1 LIVE  ANIMALS;  ANIMAL  PRODUCTS  ___  __________  ______
1  4  3  2  0  9  6  5  0  _  1
2  1  1  0  0  4  1  1  1  2  1
3  1r-  ~  ]  2  0  6  3  0  2  1  _  I
4  3  0  0  5  3  4  1  0  1
5 - 1 re  =  2=  =  0  1  4  1  0  2  0  0
11  VEGETABLE PRODUCTS  j-  _  -
6  0  1  0  0  3  0  0  0  0  0
72  0  0  0  6  2  3  0  0
8  4  3  S2  2  5  2  2  2  2  1
9  4  7  2  3  7  4  1  0  1  6
10  2  0  1  0  6  8  3  0  2  1
11  2  1  1  0  2  2  0  1  0  1
12  4  2  3  1  5  5  3  I  2  0
13  1  2  0  0  2  7  0  0  1  0  0
14  2  2  0  0  2  1  1  0  1  0
III  ANIMAL OR 1VEGETABLE  FATS AND OILS.  _
151  0  1  3  1  1  1  1  3  1  3  1  I  1  2  1  2  1  0
TV  PREPARED FOODSTUFFS; BEVERAGES; SPIRITS AND VINEGAR; TOBACCO AND MANUFACTURES.
16  0  0  1  1  0  3  1  0  0  0  0
17  1  4  0  0  7  1  0  0  0  2  1
18  1i  4  2  1  3  1  0  0  1  2
19  0  0  0  0  5  1  10  0  1  1
20  0  1  0  0  3  1  0  0  1  0
21  0  1  0  0  1  2  0  0  .0  0
22  0  1  0  0  2  3  0  0  1I  0
23  1  0  1  1  1  3  1  1  1  11  0
24  1  0  0  0  i  0  0  0  0  0
V MINERAL PRODUCTS  _  _  _  _  _______
251  2  1  2  1  2  6  2  1  1  0  0
26j  0  ]  1  0  0  6  6  0  0  1  1
271  3  5  1  2  13  5  1  2  1  1
VI PRODUCTS OF THE CHEMICAL OR ALLIED INDUSTRIES  _  ___
28  1  1  0  0  1  2  0  0  0  0
29  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0
30  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  0
31  I  o  0  0  4  4  0  1  0  0
32  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
33  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0
34  0  0  0  0  1  0  i  I  0
35  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
36  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0
37  0  0  0  0  3  1  1  10  0  0
381  0  j  2  0  0  2  1  0  0  0
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